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ABSTRACT
The French tendering system for urban public transport services, introduced by
the Sapin law in 1993, has often been criticized for its lack of competition. In order to
check the relevance of this criticism, this thesis examines the degree of competition in the
French market, using two surveys of the outcomes of tenders in the urban public transport
networks outside the Paris region. The first one was conducted by the CERTU (Centre
d'Etudes sur les Reseaux, les Transports, l'Urbanisme Et les Constructions Publiques) in
1996. The second survey, undertaken in 1999 as part of this thesis research, focused on
networks serving a population over 200,000 inhabitants and is based on the official
minutes of the organizing authorities on the deliberation of the delegation of urban public
transport services, and interviews conducted with organizing authorities, operators, and
several organizations involved in urban public transport in France.
Based on these two surveys, it is established that there is a small number of
participants in most French tenders and that the operators in general lack competitive
behavior. From this evidence, the thesis identifies five reasons for the lack of competition
in the French tendering system. One obstacle is regulatory: labor law L122.12, which
imposes the renewal of employment contracts on the new incumbent. The other four
obstacles are: asymmetries among bidders, high tendering costs, high operation risks, and
the OA's perceived failure to conduct a fair selection. A literature review of the relevant
theories on competition, industry concentration and tendering, is conducted in order to
support the analysis of obstacles to competition in French tendering with the necessary
theoretical background. It is then shown that all the five factors are barriers to entry, and
that they should be removed, or at least reduced, in order to stimulate the entry of new
competitors and therefore true competition.
The thesis concludes with a presentation of a set of three strategies to improve the
competition in the French market, that could be implemented within the current
regulatory framework, that is to say, without modifying labor law L122-12. For each
strategy, the tradeoffs between increased competition and effectiveness and quality of
service are discussed. The first strategy consists of the reduction in the bundle size of
service to be tendered out. The second strategy proposes a reduction of contract duration,
and the third strategy consists in the improvement of the specification and selection
process. It is recommended to combine all three strategies together for maximum impact
on competition; this impact may however be modest, as a major barrier to entry, labor
law L122-12, has not been removed. The modest increase in the number of bidders that
could be achieved may still lead to an improvement in competition, and therefore in
price.
Thesis Supervisor: Nigel H. M. Wilson
Title: Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The British deregulation of urban bus services (outside London) initiated with the
1985 Transport Act has been at the center of the debate in the international urban public
transport scene for the last fifteen years. Immediate reactions were often strong and
controversial, most of them focusing on the deregulation's impacts on operating
efficiency and fares. Since 1995, a growing consensus in favor of a midway model
between the traditional regulated system and the British model is emerging in Europe.
The French experiment in the urban public transport sector outside the Paris
region has received far less attention. One reason for this lack of interest lies in the
repeated criticism that the French system involves strong political control by monopoly
operators, whether they are private or public. A variant of the midway model,
implemented in 1993, the French model is nonetheless a solution worthy of closer
examination. In this study, we shall therefore describe the French model for urban areas
outside the Paris region, and investigate the relevance of the above criticism by assessing
the performance of the French tendering procedure in fostering competition. Then, we
shall identify the obstacles to a truly competitive French tendering system, and finally
explore some corrective measures within the existing regulatory framework.
In this introductory chapter, we shall first set the background of this thesis, briefly
describing the recent developments in urban public transport in Europe and in France,
and summarizing the debate that spanned the last two decades on an optimal regulatory
regime for this sector. We shall then describe the general characteristics of the current
preferred model, the midway or "limited competition" model, and introduce the French
model. We shall next introduce the question of lack of competition in the French urban
public transport market, and finally present the objectives and organization of this thesis.
1.1 The Need for a Strong Urban Public Transport System
All European countries have been experiencing similar trends in their urban
transport patterns. With increased purchasing powers, European life styles have evolved
in the last three decades. Most households now own at least one car, and many have
chosen to live in suburban areas. The average distance traveled every day by each
European citizen has increased from 16.5 km in 1970 to 31.5 km in 1993. These changes
make it more difficult for urban public transport to provide an adequate level of mobility.
Consequently, as the demand for transport continues to rise it is mostly met by increased
use of cars, which now accounts for 75% of kilometers traveled (European Commission,
1995). Between 1972 and 1992, car ownership and use grew in all European countries
and dramatically affected the modal split as shown in Tables 1.1 and 1.2.
Table 1.1: Vehicle km of Car Use per Capita
Country 1970 1975 1980 1985 1992
Denmark 3,544 4,254 4,735 5,790
France 2,615 3,629 4,463 4,739 5,824
Germany 3,366 4,269 4,830 5,136 6,228
Italy 2,240 2,851 3,338 3,733 5,438
Sweden 6,329 6,713
UK 2,976 3,539 4,108 4,165 6,000
Source: Pucher and Lefevre (1996)
Table 1.2: Modal Split in Urban Areas (as Percentage of Total Trips), 1990 (or Latest
Available Year)
Country Car Public Two Walking Other
Transport Wheelers
Denmark 42 14 20 21 3
France 54 12 4 30 0
Germany 52 11 10 27 0
Italy 25 21 54
Sweden 36 11 10 39 4
UK 62 14 8 12 4
Source: Pucher and Lefevre (1996)
France follows the same trends as evident in other European countries, with the
dominance of the car and the erosion of public transport. On average, the number of daily
trips per urban resident has been stable at around 3.2 for the last 15 years. The time spent
daily on trips has not significantly changed either and is about 55 minutes mainly as a
result of improvement in public transport and road traffic conditions (Beaucire, 1996).
However, trip purposes have evolved: whereas 20 years ago, journeys to work accounted
for roughly 50% of the total trips, they now account for a much smaller proportion (for
example 19% in Grenoble in 1992, and 24% in Toulouse in 1990). The portion of trips
made for other purposes, such as shopping and leisure, has increased significantly,
accounting for 61% of total trips in Grenoble and 59% in Toulouse. As a result of
changes in the location of residences and activities, the majority of motorized trips are no
longer related to the urban core but are made within the periphery (75% in Grenoble and
66% in Paris) (Pucher and Lefevre, 1996).
Table 1.3: Evolution of Mobility by Mode (in Average Number of Trip per Day, for All
French Urban Areas)
Modes 1973-77 1978-82 1983-87 1988-92
Public Transport 0.28 0.26 0.35 0.34
Private Car 1.27 1.46 1.63 1.94
Walking + Two Wheelers 1.56 1.46 1.28 1.09
Source: Beaucire (1996)
As a result, the car became in the early 1980's the dominant mode in the French
urban areas (see Table 1.3) and in 1990 reached a mode share of 54%, against 12% for
public transport, 4% for two-wheelers and 30% for walking.
This increased car use has led to severe congestion and air pollution in many
cities. According to OECD (1995) estimates, vehicle speed has declined by 10% over the
last 20 years in major OECD cities. OECD estimated that congestion costs amounted to
2% of the GDP. This implies that congestion costs in the European Union were about
ECU 120 billion in 1995, which is about one quarter of the amount spent on public
passenger transport across the EU. Road traffic in general has important environmental
consequences. It has been estimated that transport causes 62% of carbon monoxide (CO),
50% of nitrogenoxide (NOx), 33% of hydrocarbon and 17% of carbon dioxide (C0 2)
emissions (European Commission, 1995). In addition to resulting concerns relating to
both local and global air pollution, it was calculated that 20% of Europe's citizens suffer
from unacceptable levels of noise from road traffic.
As the space allocated to roads is limited, the excess traffic cannot be resolved
through an increase of road capacity for at least two reasons. First, the cost of
construction of road and parking infrastructure in densely populated areas continues to
increase. Second, studies indicate that extending infrastructure results in more journeys
overall as road users make use of the new road facilities, worsening the impact on
environment.
In addition, captive users of public transport - those who do not have a car or
cannot use a car - experience social and economic disadvantages where mobility depends
substantially on the availability of cars. In his Green Paper "The Citizen Network:
Fulfilling the potential of public passenger transport in Europe" (European Commission,
1995), European Commissioner Kinnock argues that in order to answer the collective
need, i.e. to minimize the negative impacts of the traffic congestion, it is important to
limit the number of individuals travelling by car, and therefore to make urban public
transport more effective.
Congestion is usually caused by collective demands in space and time. These
traffic patterns fit particularly well with the comparative advantages of collective
transport, which is much more energy efficient than private car (at an occupancy rate of
only 50%, public transport consumes five times less energy per passenger km than a
private car). Thanks to technological improvements, public transport has improved its
level of service and become more reliable, more comfortable and safer. It is also more
environmental friendly: the air pollution in terms of emission of urban air pollutants per
passenger km is between four and eight times less for public transport than for cars
(European Commission, 1995).
However, the challenges facing public transport are many: dispersion of
residential areas, outdated equipment, street crime leading to staff and passenger security
problems, all act to deter the use of public transport. Moreover, as public transport
operations are not financially profitable, they often rely on public subsidies, which
increasingly suffer from constraints on public budgets. To answer these challenges,
Kinnock proposed a new mission and a new policy framework for public transport in
Europe.
Pucher and Lefevre (1996) explore the same direction and argue that much of the
variations in European urban public transport trends can be explained by differences in
public policies among European countries. Thus the decrease of 26% in ridership in the
urban public transport in Great Britain from 1975 to 1990 at least partly results from
subsidy reductions and fare increases. Over the same period, France, which pursued the
opposite policy, experienced a rise of 58% of the use of urban public transport.
Beyond the policy on subsidies and fares, the choice of a regulatory regime is
crucial for the revitalization of urban public transport in Europe. In his Green Paper,
Kinnock recommends modernization of the regulatory framework. The underlying
questions are: what should be the roles of authorities and operators? And what should be
the access regime of the operators to the urban public transport market? The deregulation
and privatization experiments in Great Britain triggered a debate in Europe over these
questions and eventually provided some elements of a strategy.
1.2 Deregulation and Privatization: a Debate in Europe
Since the bus deregulation that began with inter-urban routes in Britain in 1980,
there have been discussions in the other European countries on the appropriate policy to
follow in this area. One clear objective in this discussion is the need for reduction in
public expenditures. By allowing the private sector to provide urban public transport, the
government expects higher efficiency, therefore lower costs, and consequently lower
subsidies.
Another element in the discussion, at least in theory, is the differences in the
ideologies that appear among the European countries. However, Andersen's (1993) view
is that the main forces for change found in Europe outside Britain can be explained by the
need to reduce public spending more than by any ideological reason.
Once the principle that competition yields higher productive efficiency was
accepted, the next task was to find the best way of introducing competition in the market.
Is it better:
- to get the benefits from competition among suppliers through competitive
tendering within a framework of planned and coordinated system with cross-
subsidies,
- or to deregulate fully?
Reacting to the pro-deregulation arguments of the white paper published by the
British government prior to its enactment of comprehensive intra-urban public transport
deregulation (outside London), Gwilliam, Nash and Mackie (1985 a, b) argued that
competitive tendering with a planned and coordinated network and identified cross-
subsidization was a better option than full deregulation. According to them, tendering, or
"competition for the road", would provide efficiency gains while avoiding the negative
aspects associated with the "competition on the road". Furthermore, they argued that
great benefits could be achieved from the provision of integrated services, which requires
fares and service to be planned jointly. They also claimed that central planning was
essential for the exploitation of scale economies emanating from a joint bus-rail network,
from a simplified ticketing system, and from route planning that combines less profitable
routes with more lucrative ones.
Beesley and Glaister (1985 a, b) strongly disagreed, arguing that planners and
central planning are largely deficient in providing an appropriate urban public transport
service design and in establishing a suitable fare structure. Besides disagreeing on cross-
subsidization, costs, and efficient resource allocation, they offered four main reasons why
competition would be ineffective without deregulation. Gwilliam et al. (1985, b) replied
to each of them.
The first reason is that competition would be between established operators
because of their protection in lucrative markets. Gwilliam et al. argued that good routes
would be tendered as well as the bad ones, so that the profits on good routes would
accrue to the local authority, not to the operator. Moreover, they believed that the fact
that half of the total fleet of buses is held by small private operators ensures a certain
level of competition under the franchising system. Indeed, according to Gwilliam et al.,
some operators are "more inclined to compete for a franchise which gives them some
security than to challenge existing operators on the road".
The second argument cites a slower pace of change under the tendering system
than under deregulation, which is considered as an advantage by Gwilliam et al.
The third reason is that a bidding system would require that the competition
among bidders is reduced to one or two competitive variables, as local authorities would
have to specify what service they want and the way they will assess the bids. For this
reason, many dimensions of competition such as time at which service is offered,
frequency, and quality of vehicle, may not be taken into account by the authorities in a
tendering system, whereas they would be tested in an unregulated market. Gwilliam et al.
argued that a conscious political decision on these dimensions may not be a bad thing.
The last reason is that the likely outcome of a comprehensive franchising system
is the "capture" of the authority by the incumbent franchisee: the authority tends to be
persuaded that there is a good case to condone the non performance under the contract by
the incumbent operator. Gwilliam et al. replied that the "stage bus industry does offer the
prospect of a large number of small, short-period (say 3 year), and easily monitored
contracts. The danger of "capture" by a single incumbent is minimal".
In 1985, Britain chose the option of full deregulation for bus transport in urban
areas outside London, but with mixed results. As a result, the operation costs decreased,
by around 40%, but the patronage also significantly declined. After much discussion, the
British government decided in 1993 to cancel the original plan to apply the full
deregulation model to London, settling instead for a tendering system. The continental
European countries did not view the British experiment with deregulation as successful,
and even though some show signs of more liberal regimes, most of them, with the notable
exceptions of the Scandinavian countries and France, still have in 1999 a regulated
system, as we shall see in the next section.
1.3 The Limited Competition Model
Isotope, a survey initiated by the European Commission in 1996, compared the
regulations and organizational structures for urban public transport operations in the
European countries. Isotope identified three types of regulatory framework in Europe: the
regulated regime, the deregulated regime and the "limited competition" regime.
- Under the regulated regime, which can be found in Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, the Netherlands and Ireland,
the urban public transport is produced by public monopolies with no competition in,
or for, the market.
- Under the deregulated regime, adopted in Great Britain outside London,
competition occurs in the market or "on the road", as market entry and exit are quasi-
free. The producers, the private operators, take the initiative in planning and offering
service.
- Under the "Limited competition" regime, the public authority is
responsible for network design, fares, service (frequency) and the operators compete
only during the tendering process for an exclusive right or "for the road". This model
is mainly implemented in countries where the perception of urban public transport as
a social need is strong and where a transfer of responsibilities over urban public
transport from central government to local governments has occurred. This is the case
in France and in the Scandinavian countries, as well as in London.
Van de Velde (1997) classifies organizational models according to the initiator of the
service, whether it is the public authority or the operator. As in all "limited competition"
models, the authority takes the initiative for the service in the French system. In most
French networks, the authority also has the ownership of the vehicles and other fixed
facilities. As shown in Figure 1.1, two scenarios are then possible, the "regie" (own
production) or the delegated management. These scenarios are described in chapter 2.
Figure 1.1: Organizational Forms of Public Transport Services
All organisational forms of public transport services
..... ................ .....  .. . . .
Authority initiative (legal monopoly) "Private" initiative
Franchising Public Licensing Free
systems ownership systems competition
Own production Dominated by
public companies
Delegated Dominated by
management private companies
Source: Van de Velde (1995)
In its executive summary, Isotope concludes that the "limited competition" model is
the best choice for a theoretical fresh start, as it provides a good compromise between
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optimal cost efficiency, best achieved under the deregulated model, and optimal service
integration, best obtained under the regulated model. Let us therefore provide more
details on the organization associated with the limited competition model.
The term "competitive tendering" is used here to indicate that the authority assigns
exclusive rights to supply a particular bundle of services to an operator whose bid - or
offer to provide the service - was assessed as superior to those of the other competitors.
As noted by Berechman (1993), "competitive tendering is thus a mechanism used by a
public authority to award production rights in situation where market competition is
regarded as non-viable, unwarranted, or otherwise unfeasible to implement. In addition to
being a substitute for direct public production and control, this approach is seen as a
mean to reduce costs, promote efficiency, and render a significant role to the private
sector in the production of goods and services".
There are indeed situations where market competition may not be viable. Indeed,
beside its poor performance in attracting patronage, the deregulated system was also
criticized for its lack of contestability in the market. Banister, Berechman and de Rus
Mendoza (1993) have shown that doubts can be raised over the contestability of the
British bus market and that, at best, it can be defined as a market where imperfect
competition prevails. They argued that the size of the market is too small and that there
are too many opportunities for collusion between operators. Information asymmetries,
market deterrence from the incumbent, natural monopoly and high sunk costs are the
reasons most cited for this market failure.
When considering the allocation of the roles between the public authority and the
operator, it is useful to distinguish between strategic, tactical and operational levels.
Strategic management consists in the formulation of general goals and in the
determination, in broad terms, of the means that can be used to reach these goals. At the
tactical level, decisions are made on the means that can help to reach the general goals,
and how to use them most efficiently. The operational level ensures that the product is
produced in an efficient way. Table 1.4 describes these three levels applied to public
transport.
Table 1.4: Strategic, Tactical and Operational Levels in Public Transport
Strategic Level Tactical Level Operational Level
General goals Fares Vehicle rostering
Service area Routes Drivers rostering
Target markets Timetables Personnel management
General product (service) Product (service) type Maintenance
characteristics
Purchase of consumables
Fleet renewal mangement
Source: Isotope (1997)
In a limited competition regime, both strategic and tactical levels remain the
responsibility of the public authority, whereas tasks involved in the operational level are
contracted out. Besides performing its technical work at the tactical level - network
design and definition of the service characteristics - the authority is also responsible for
the selection and monitoring of the operators. All these tasks require a high level of
technical and managerial competence on the side of the authority.
Finally, Berechman (1993) considers that competitive tendering has a dual role - a
control role (control over the service produced by the operator) and an efficiency role
(efficiency from competition among bidders) - and argues that these two roles are in
direct conflict with each other. Berechman argues that effective public control must come
at the expense of the managerial decision-making freedom of the operator, and vice
versa. He views this trade-off between control and efficiency as a form of "institutional
failure" in designing a satisfactory policy scheme, especially if the authority wants to
design a truly competitive bidding scheme.
In order to test Berechman's pessimistic opinion about the limited competition
model, stated in 1993, a review of the performance of existing tendering systems (France,
London, Scandinavia) is appropriate. Only a few comprehensive studies of the
performance of tendering systems have been conducted so far. Andersen (1993, a)
analyzed the Scandinavian experience in 1993. The results of the London experience with
tendering were assessed by Kennedy (1995).
Based on the analysis of tenders conducted between 1989 and 1991, Andersen
(1993)'s comments on the Scandinavian tenders are as follows. First, the cost savings
achieved by the use of tendering were about 20 to 30% in Swedish urban areas and 10%
in Copenhagen. Second, there are two obstacles to the sustainability of cost saving: the
use of minimum cost-contracts and the lack of competition in factor market (mainly
wages). Third, the increased concentration in the market may reduce savings in the long
run due to re-monopolization and the erection of new barriers to entry. These barriers to
entry are related to the availability of used buses, the availability of maintenance
facilities, and the availability of terminals. Andersen concludes that there is a need for
stronger competition policies and competition authorities, and that "new methods of
combining operator incentives with authority control over important parts of fares and
routes" remain to be found. The progress made on this last issue by organizing authorities
in Europe was documented in the UITP (1998) survey: "Incentive Agreements in Public
Bus Transport".
Kennedy (1995) analyzed the tenders conducted in London between 1985 and
1993, i.e. until London Bus Limited (LBL)'s privatization and drew two conclusions.
First, London bus tendering, organized by London Transport (LT), has led to cost savings
of 16% on tendered routes. Cost savings have stemmed from increased productivity,
reduced wages and reduced overhead costs. According to Kennedy, tendering has also
improved the quality of bus service, which had, in turn, a positive impact on revenue.
Second, there were perceptions among managers of bus companies involved in tendering
that the system was unfair, either because LBL bids were subsidized or because tenders
were not awarded to the lowest cost bidder. Kennedy noted: "Such perceptions are
important because operators may be discouraged from bidding for tenders. If they do not
bid, contract prices are likely to rise. This problem could be partly solved by privatization
of the LBL companies which dispel suspicion about the relationship between LBL and
LT". Finally, a review of the challenges currently faced by LT in its bus tendering is
provided in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
We can observe that both studies express concern over the lack of true
competition in the tendering process, which may give some support to Berechman's
pessimistic opinion of tendering systems. The other European variant of the limited
competition model, the French system, has yet to be studied in a comprehensive manner.
This can be explained by the relatively recent implementation of the Sapin law, in 1993,
and the fact that around one third of the big networks (serving populations over 200,000
inhabitants) tendered their services in 1998 for the first time. The purpose of this thesis is,
therefore, to contribute to a better understanding and assessment of the performance of
the French tendering system for the delegation of urban public transport services.
1.4 Competition in the French Market
The French system outside the Paris region shows the main characteristics of a
'limited competition" model. The LOTI Law (1982) gave full responsibility to
Organizing Authorities for providing urban public transport to the members of the
community (the Paris urban region was excluded from the scope of this law). The
competition element was introduced in 1993 by the Sapin Law whereby any delegation of
service should be through competitive tendering.
As early as 1993, Lefevre and Offner (1993) offered some interesting conjecture
on the performance of the French tendering system. They warned that, "the transit
authorities' true power to lay down and control policies is measured by their freedom to
take advantage of competition and to change operators". In order to be on a more equal
footing during the negotiations with the operator, usually a large company, many OA's
have been hiring transport technicians. However, Lefevre and Offner were pessimistic on
the relevance of these recruitment efforts made by the OAs, arguing that "this trend
towards greater technical competence in local authorities is nevertheless likely to serve
no purpose if the all-pervading presence of a small number of large, privately owned
companies is confirmed."
The French urban public transport industry is indeed highly concentrated: three
groups (VIA-GTI, Transdev and CGEA) share more than 70% of the market. However,
European private groups, especially the Bristish and French groups, have changed their
strategy in recent years and are increasingly looking for new markets outside their
traditional operating areas. This recent trend may increase the degree of competition in
countries that have a deregulated or limited competition regime, such as in the French
market. Indeed, several British companies have been submitting bids - so far, in vain -
for French networks, and the operation of Perpignan's (population of 113,469) urban
public transport network was earlier this year delegated to a Spanish operator.
The European Commission is preparing a new regulation on urban public
transport services in Europe, and considers the French system as a possible model. Six
years after the implementation of the Sapin Law and at the dawn of the
internationalization of the urban public transport industry in Europe, it is therefore all the
more interesting to examine the level of competition achieved by the French model
outside Paris region.
1.5 Objectives and Organization of the Thesis
For this purpose, and in order to assess, in particular, the relevance of the
criticism that the French system involves strong political control by monopoly operators,
we shall consider, in this thesis, the following questions. Despite a highly concentrated
industry, is the French urban public transport market truly competitive? If not, what are
possible explanations for the lack of competition? Finally, what strategies could remedy
or improve this situation? In order to answer these questions, we adopt the following
strategy:
- Assess the performance of the French tendering system in introducing
competition, by evaluating the number of potential players in the markets and
analyzing their competitive behavior. We shall rely on two surveys, one
conducted in 1996 by the CERTU (1997), and a second conducted in 1999 for this
thesis research. We shall also rely on interviews with representatives of
organizing authorities, of operators, of the Ministry of Transport, and of other
organizations such as the operators' association, the UTP (Union des Transports
Publics) and the authorities' association, the GART (Groupement des Autorites
responsables de Transport).
- From this evidence, identify several reasons for the lack of competition in the
French tendering system, distinguishing between regulatory obstacles and the
organizing authorities' practices.
- Conduct a literature review of the relevant theories on competition, industry
concentration and tendering, in order to support our analysis with the necessary
theoretical background.
- Finally, propose a set of strategies to improve competition in the French market,
that could be implemented within the current regulatory framework.
It is clear that this respect of the existing regulation may limit significantly the overall
improvement that can be achieved. However, we may argue, first, that the regulation
often reflects a (current) consensus on tradeoffs that are shared by elected officials and
the population of the country. Second, a regulatory change may take years. Third, the
improvement resulting from the proposed strategies without any regulatory change may
be sufficient to reach an acceptable level of competition, i.e. sufficient to obtain an
acceptable price for the service.
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 will describe the French regulatory
framework of urban public transport, with a review of the successive legislative steps that
led to the implementation of a limited competition regime: the LOTI and the Sapin law.
In this chapter, we will also describe the current market structure in France: the
Organizing Authorities, the operators, and the contractual practices. In Chapter 3, the
results of the two surveys will be presented and discussed; several factors contributing to
the lack of competition in French tenders will be identified. Finally, in Chapter 4, we
shall provide some theoretical support for these empirical explanations, and propose
different strategies to improve the level of competition in the French urban public
transport market.
Chapter 2: The French Urban Public Transport Industry
Over the last three decades, the French urban public transport industry has undergone
radical change. Its regulatory environment evolved under three major laws: the
"Versement de transport" in 1971, the LOTI law in 1982, and the Sapin law in 1993. In
terms of market structure it was deeply altered in the late 1980's and early 1990's by a
strong wave of concentration among the private operators, whose effects are increasingly
being felt.
In the first section of this chapter, we will describe the successive legislative
actions that first triggered a revitalization of urban public transport in France in the
1970's, and later resulted in the emergence in 1993 of a regulatory framework which can
be classified as a form of the "limited competition" model. The second section describes
the current status of the French urban public transport industry: the actors - the
organizing authorities (OA's) and the major operators - and the contracting practices.
2.1 The Institutional Context and Regulatory Framework for Urban Public Transport
In each conurbation in France, except in the Paris region, the organizing authority
and operator are bound by a contract, which specifies their reciprocal responsibilities and
sets forth their objectives, which must be regularly assessed and revised. Since 1982, the
form and content of agreements are governed by the principles of the "Law on
Orientation of Internal Transport", referred to as the LOTI, dated 30 December 1982,
which established the independence of the local authorities. In 1993, competition was
introduced by the 93-122 law on prevention of corruption and the provision of openness
in economic life and public procedures. This law, called the "Sapin" law, redefined the
conditions under which public service obligations were delegated and, among others,
made compulsory the setting up of a tendering procedure. In this section, we shall, after a
brief description of the French institutional context and a review of the urban public
transport revival in the 1970's, review the main lines of the LOTI law, and then present
the implications of the Sapin law for urban public transport.
In this thesis, we shall focus exclusively on provincial networks. The situation of
urban public transport in the Paris region is, at least for the moment, quite distinct. Its
organization and production rely for the most part on two state-owned companies, the
RATP (Regie Autonome des Transports Parisiens) and the SNCF (Societe Nationale des
Chemins de Fer Francais). The Paris region operates within a different regulatory
framework than that of the provinces, based on several legal documents. Order 59-151
and decree 59-157 of January 7, 1959, as amended, defines the RATP and SNCF
responsibilities in the Paris region. Decree 49-1473 of November 14, 1949 governs public
transport services. Decree 59-1091 of September 23, 1959 covers the status of RATP and
decree 59-1090 of the same day covers the status of the STP.
2.1.1 Urban Public Transport in France in the 1970's
France, with an area of 551,000 square kilometers, is the largest country in
Europe with a population of 58 million. It is a centrally governed state with three
institutional levels below that of the state: 36,500 communes at the smallest level, 95
departements, and 22 regions. These three levels of communities are governed by elected
councils, have their own tax revenue, and may borrow. In addition, the three institutional
levels can form partnerships. In particular, communes can group in seven forms: the
intercommunal syndicate, the district, the association of communes, the association of
cities, the new town syndicate, the urban community, and the mixed syndicate. The main
differences between the various forms lie in the extent to which the body has been set-up
voluntarily, in the degree of rigidity of its structure (composition and dissolution), in the
degree of delegation of powers from the communes, and in the extent of its fiscal powers.
Table 2.1: The Associations of Communes in France in 1993 (all types)
Form of Association of Number of Population Number of
Communes Communes (in million) Associations
Intercommunal syndicates 5,996 11.85
Districts 2,580 7.87 282
Associations of Communes n.a. 1.98 193
Associations of Cities n.a. 1.47 4
New Towns Syndicates 51 0.65 9
Urban Communities 251 4.1 9
Mixed syndicates n.a. n.a. 975
Source: Ministere de l'Equipement, des Transports et du Logement (1995)
Since 1973, the communes have been encouraged to group by a law that endows
the associations with new resources for financing urban public transport, a payroll tax
called the "Versement de Transport". This unique feature of the French urban public
transport system was introduced in 1971 in Paris, and in 1973 in the provinces, and
proved to be successful in creating groups of communes, since all French urban areas
now have an OA whose territory, the Urban Transport Perimeter (PTU), covers most of
the contiguous area.
This payroll tax is levied on companies with more than nine employees in the
PTU. The population threshold for levying it was 300,000 in 1973, then lowered to
100,000 in 1974, and to 30,000 in 1982. The OA chooses the tax rate, between 0% to 1%
(up to 1.75% if a reserved right of way system is being built) and decides on the use of
the proceeds between investments and operating expenses. Beside giving great financial
autonomy to the OA's, the Versement de Transport was a decisive element in urban
public transport policy in stopping the decline of the urban public transport vehicle fleets
and infrastructure of the late sixties.
In the early 1970's, the ridership in the provinces reached its lowest level after the
second world war. Structural operating deficits put most private operators in a critical
financial situation and forced local governments to take over their vehicle fleets and fixed
installations. Beside capital grants from the central government in return for increased
ridership, the Versement de Transport provided the local governments with the basic
financial means for this rehabilitation program. As a result, transportation supply grew by
6.8% per annum between 1975 and 1985, and ridership increased by 3.5% per annum.
This was a relatively satisfactory achievement when compared to the situation prevailing
at that time in most other industrialized countries where there was still no integrated
action from public authorities to deal with the decline of the urban public transport
system.
However, many OAs considered the Versement de transport as manna from
heaven and did not use it very wisely. They extended urban networks, especially into the
suburbs, while keeping fares low, which was not financially sustainable in the long run
and required increasing support from the central government. The fares portion of income
dropped from 77% in 1975 to 49% in 1985. Similarly, the Versement de Transport was
increasingly used to cover operating expenses and less and less for investment. In the
provinces, the portion of the Versement de Transport allocated to the operating expenses
rose from 45% in 1975 to 63% in 1985.
In order to cope with increasing deficits, the central government changed its
policy and aimed at modifying the OA's behavior. Andersen (1993, b) described the
evolution that took place after 1978 in Sweden, where, "from a situation where local
governments and bus operators tried to get as much money out of the central government
as possible during central responsibility for public transport, the transfer of
responsibilities to local government has resulted in changing attitudes". Although France
had always been a very centralized state, the central government decided to decentralize
the urban public transport sector almost completely, both politically and economically.
This was mainly achieved by the enactment in 1982 of the "Loi d'Orientation des
Transports Interieurs", the LOTI law - and a group of application laws in the following
years - as described in the next section.
2.1.2 The LOTI: a Strong Role for The Organizing Authority
The LOTI introduced innovations such as the Urban Travel Plans or "Plans des
Deplacements Urbains" (PDU's), and the "right to transport". The PDU's main objective
was to develop an integrated multi-modal transport planning process, with a special
interest in the promotion of alternative modes such as walking and cycling.
Unfortunately, very few urban areas implemented a PDU and the incentive for its
implementation disappeared in 1986, when the PDU was no longer required to obtain
governmental assistance. The LOTI clearly implies social goals as it consolidates the
"right to transport" i.e. the right of the citizens to have a good quality public transport
system to reach their work place, social-cultural activities, and leisure activities. In
addition to this principle, the LOTI clarified the relations between the OA and the
operators by obliging both parties to sign a contract.
"The State, and local authorities or associations thereof within the limits of their
authority, will organize the regular public transport of persons. This service will be
provided either through administration by a public person in the form of a public
industrial and commercial service, or by a company which has signed an agreement of
limited duration to that effect with the competent authority. This agreement sets out the
general character and conditions for the operation and financing of the service. It defines
the actions to be undertaken by both parties, with the object of ensuring the effective
exercise of the right to transportation, and the promotion of public transport of persons."
The concern for economic and social goals is also expressed in the fare policy:
"The fare policy is defined by the competent authority in a manner which will ensure best
use of the transport system from the economic and social viewpoint."
Moreover, the LOTI defines the general responsibilities of the State and the local
authorities in the matter of transport. It stipulates that the "preparation and
implementation of the overall transport policy are provided jointly by the State and the
local authorities, within the terms of the European Community rules as set out by the
Treaty of Rome". Furthermore, the LOTI gives full responsibility for urban public
transport to Communes and associations of Communes, wherever an "urban transport
perimeter" (PTU) has been defined. In this case, the commune or association of
communes constitutes the organizing authority.
Even after the decentralization, the State still remains a major actor in urban
public transport. The State still controls the total urban public transport system in Paris
region, which accounts for 18% of the population and 21% of the jobs. It controls the two
leading operators SNCF for trains and the RATP for buses and the metro - and the
Parisian OA, the Syndicat des Transports Parisiens (STP). This situation may change in
the future, as the project of transferring State's seats in the STP's board to the local
government, the "region", after being on and off for the last two decades, is back on the
central government's agenda.
At the national level, the State defines a general policy framework for urban and
non-urban passenger public transport in order to provide good public service. It defines
the safety standards and controls their technical application. It develops analytical and
decision-making tools such as statistics and studies, and promotes research and
innovation. Finally, the Sate has an incentive role in the promotion of urban public
transport network, especially by granting capital investment funds to projects presented
by local authorities.
However, the main impact of the LOTI for urban public transport, is the extensive
responsibilities gained by local organizing authorities: they create the urban transport
perimeter (PTU) and organize public transport including: the network design, the choice
of the technical operating methods, the fare policy (within the maximum growth rate
fixed every year by the State), the choice and contracting of operators, and the setting and
financing of subsidies for construction and operation. The OA's create and manage the
transport infrastructure and equipment, regulate the transport activity, and monitor its
application. Finally, the OA's have to develop an information data-base on the transport
system.
In addition, the OA's have, under the LOTI, the choice between two methods of
production of the services (this freedom of choice was kept under the Sapin law). The
first method, under which the urban public transport services are produced publicly, is
found in 10% of the networks, mainly small cities and Marseilles. The second method
consists in the delegation of services to an independent company.
There are two types of public production or "regie". The first type is a distinct
department of the OA with financial independance. The second form of "regie" has the
status of a person with financial independence, and is a public agency called a public
industrial and commercial company or "Etablissement Public Industrial et Commercial"
(EPIC) with an individualized organization. The OA has the choice on the management
and financial organization of the "regie". However, the 'regie's" accounts must follow
the rules governing public accounting. It is interesting to note that this power of the OA
to decide whether to delegate the urban public transport service provision or to have it
produced by a public agency is controversial at the European Commission. (As we will
see later, under the "regie" method, there is no tendering, and thus no competition. In this
respect, the French system is therefore not strictly in compliance with the philosophy of
the "limited competition" model). More "regies" may be established, as the OA's more
and more face a lack of competition during their tendering process for the renewal of the
delegation contract, as we shall see in Chapter 4. In 1997, La Rochelle (population
133,428) chose not to renew the existing delegation contract, and set up an EPIC instead.
The most popular production method, which is chosen by 90% of the OAs, is the
delegation of the services to an independent transport operator. Under this method, the
vehicle fleet and fixed facilities in most of the networks are owned by the OA, but it may
happen that the delegatee is asked to take responsibility for part of these investments.
This blurs the distinction between the franchise (where the operator owns the equipment)
and the management contract (where the operator just provides management staff). As
this distinction is not implicitly made under the current French system, we shall hereafter
use the term "delegation contract" for both contract types.
To select the operator, the OA has the choice between two procedures: the
procedure of the public markets, which stipulates a call for tender and a selection by the
lowest-bid, and, before the law of February 1998, did not allow any negotiation on the
specifications with the winner. Urban transport, together with other utility sectors, was
exempted from this law under the argument of the Public Service Obligation (PSO). As a
result of the limited flexibility of this public market procedure, all the OA's chose the
second procedure, termed the Delegation of Public Service (DSP). The DSP procedure
was not specified by law before the Sapin law, and most of the time before 1993,
consisted in direct negotiation with operators (except for some rare cases of tendering).
Nowadays, the vast majority of the OA's organize their tendering under the delegation of
service procedure. Only one OA is known to have recently organized tendering under the
public markets procedure (Menton).
The regulation on delegation contracts governing the relationship between OA's
and operators has evolved since the first decree in 1954 that directly applied to urban
public transport. Hereafter follows a brief summary of this evolution before the LOTI and
the implication of the LOTI in this regard.
Under decree 54-1040 of October 19, 1954 (modified by decree 61-615 of June
16, 1961), which identifies trolley-buses explicitly and buses implicitly, "lease franchise"
contracts for construction and services, with a duration ranging from 10 to 30 years,
could be obtained without public tendering through direct negotiation. The concept of
"lease franchise" was introduced by the law of July 31, 1913 for local railroads. This is a
contract by which a public owner entitles a company to operate a public service at their
own risk and provides the associated physical resources (vehicles and infrastructure), in
return for which the franchisee pays a fee to the franchisor which reimburses the
investment cost granted by the public franchisor. The franchisee can be responsible for
capital investment for extension project. The franchisee is paid for his work through the
fares collected from the users.
The structural operating deficits that occurred in the late 1960's and 1970's made
it more and more difficult for the operators to meet their commitments under those
contracts, the OAs silently accepting the solutions proposed by the operators. In 1979 and
1980, new laws were enacted to put an end to these practices. These laws specified four
contract options, with the obligation to use one of them, except in the case of a "regie".
These four contract types were categorized as follows: operation with full risk, operation
with a revenue guarantee, operation at a fixed price, and management contract. These
laws shortened the duration of contracts to no more than 5 years, renewable once by tacit
agreement, if the franchisee financed less than 50% of the investment. If the franchisee
financed 50% or more of the investment, the duration of the contract could go up to 10
years, or even to 30 years or more by permission of the State.
The framework established by the laws of 1979 and 1980 turned our to be too
restrictive. The LOTI removed the obligation to choose among the four specified models
and following circulars dated July 5 and 17, 1984 set the minimum rules applicable to
these contracts. This increased flexibility paved the way to the wide diversity that can be
found today in the contracts of delegation in the networks.
In conclusion, the LOTI and the application laws that followed were successful in
clarifying the relationships between the State, the OAs and the operators. However,
Lefevre and Offner (1993) argued that, by giving responsibilities for urban public
transport to the intercommune level, whereas decisions on road and traffic management
were still left to the communes, this strongly limited the possibility of developing much
needed comprehensive travel policies. As a result, there is still no single area-wide
authority to take charge of all transport modes and policy. Another criticism often made
of the LOTI is the lack of transparency in the awarding of urban public transport
contracts. Indeed, until 1993, there was no obligation for the OA to award the service
contract through a competitive process. The Sapin law was designed to remedy this
problem.
2.1.3 The Sapin Law: Introduction of Competition
The Sapin law introduced two main changes in the organization of the delegation
of urban public transport services. First, it introduced competition through the obligation
to organize competitive tendering before granting any contract to delegate service.
Second, it defined minimum rules applicable to the delegation contracts.
As part of a general effort to reduce corruption in the political life and increase
transparency in public procedures, the Sapin law defines a clear procedure to be followed
to select an operator under the delegation of service. However, it is worth noting that the
tendering procedure, described in greater detail in figure 2.1, includes an "intuitu
personae" choice between the different bids, which in practice gives great flexibility to
the OA, as the choice does not necessarily rest on price alone (in contrast to the
procedure of the public markets).
In the first step, the OA's board or governing assembly, where all the political
forces are represented, makes the decision to adopt the delegation of public services
procedure (and not the public markets procedure). This decision is based on a report
which describes the characteristics of the transport services to be supplied and the
characteristics of the new contract. To qualify for the DSP procedure, the contract should
stipulate that the operator bears the operating cost risk and that a substantial portion of
the operator's remuneration is based on the operating profits. We shall provide more
details on the qualification of the various contracts types for the DSP in the section 2.2.4
on contractual practices (2.2.4).
Second, after a public call for pre-qualification applications, the OA shortlists the
candidates allowed to submit a bid, after analyzing their professional and financial
reputation and their ability to ensure the continuity of the service and provide equal
treatment of the users. Then, the OA provides each of the qualified candidates with a
report describing the quantitative and qualitative specifications of the services to be
produced, as well as (if necessary) the fare structures to be used.
In the third step, the envelops containing the bids are opened by an "ad hoc
commission" comprising the OA's president and five of its representatives, as well as, in
a consultative role, the OA's accountant and a representative of the ministry in charge of
competition. Once empowered by the OA's board, the "ad hoc commission" starts the
Figure 2.1: Public Service Delegation - Procedure for the Choice of the Operator
PRESIDENT OF THE
ORGANISING AUTHORITY
AH HOC COMMISSION FOR
ANALYSING THE PROPOSALS
GOVERNINGASSEMBLY OF
THE ORGANISING AUTHORITY
Prepare and issue a report covering:
- principles of delegation of authority
- specifications for the operation of
public transport 15 days legal minimum waiting period
(8 to 15 days)
Advertise pre-qualification
FOpen pre-qualification
(8 days)
Propose a list of pre-qualified
candidates
Send tender documents to
pre-qualified candidates
-Approve:
- principles of delegation of authority
- specifications for the operation of
public transport
-Nominate ah hoc commission members
(30 days)
Open bids
Prepare and issue a report on the
analysis of the bids and
recommended candidate
Negotiate with one or more
candidates
Send:
- selected candidate
- basic contract
- report from commission
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15 days legal minimum waiting period
Approve:
- selected candidate
- general contract budget
Source: Ministere de l'Equipement, des Transports et du Logement (1995)
Prepare and sign final contract
Send contract for legal review
within 15 days
negotiations with one or more competing companies and finally recommends the choice
of one company to the board through a report which assesses the content of the different
bids and justifies the choice of the successful bidder. At least two months after the
beginning of the third step, the OA makes a decision on the choice of the delegatee and
the delegation contract.
The tendering procedure is not compulsory when the amount of money to be paid
to the delegatee during the entire duration of the contract does not exceed FRF 700,000,
or when the contract duration is not greater than 3 years and the yearly amount owed to
the delegatee does not exceed FRF 450,000.
Beside specifying the tendering procedure, the Sapin Law defines minimum rules
applicable to the delegation contracts. In particular, it specifies that the duration of the
contracts depends on the services requested from the delegatee, and cannot exceed the
duration of depreciation of the installations if the delegatee participates in the investment.
Finally, we should note that the labor law L 212.12 stipulates that, in case of
change of operator, the contracts of all employees must be renewed by the new
incumbent operator. With the goal of providing stability to the staff working in the urban
public transport industry, this law considerably reduces the room to manoeuver of the
operator in controlling staff expenses.
In conclusion, the regulatory framework of urban public transport in France has
changed fundamentally in the last three decades and is still evolving. A recent trend is a
clearer distinction between the DSP and the public market procedures, according to the
type of risks borne by the delegatee that are specified in the delegation contract. Another
trend is the European harmonization on the production methods available to the OA's. In
particular, the European Commission is preparing a text that will specify the rules and
principles that should apply to public service concessions (i.e. delegations of public
service) in water, energy, transport, and telecommunications sectors, which are not
currently covered by council directive 93/38/EEC on service concessions (Avanzata,
1999). As a result, public production may no longer be allowed and systematic tendering
in all cases could be the rule.
2.2 Market Structure
As a result of further integration and liberalization trends in Europe, large
international public transport service providers, mainly British and French for the
moment, are now starting to appear. At the scale of the French industry, concentration
has already taken place a decade ago. Furthermore, it seems that, despite their new
interest in foreign markets and the growing threat from foreign competitors, the major
French operators are determined to retain their market share in the French networks.
After a brief review of the evolution of service supply and ridership in the French
urban public transport market, this section first describes the organizing authorities
(OAs), together with their networks; the OAs organize their own market, consisting of
the tendering, every 5 to 10 years, for the delegation of service for the network under
their responsibility. We shall then present the major French groups that operate these
networks and finally describe the current trends in the contractual relationships between
OAs and operators.
2.2.1 Introduction
In the deregulated model, there is only one market, between the operators who
initiate, organize and provide the service, and the users. In particular, the operators freely
adjust their prices and levels of service in order to maximize their profit. The "limited
competition" model operates differently, as the OA is in charge of the organization
(including network design and fares) and provision of the service. Under this model, we
can consider two distinct markets: the "provision market" between the OAs (provision)
and the users (consumption), and the "production market" between the OAs
(organization) and the operators (production).
In the French provision market, where the OA promotes the usage of urban public
transport and faces fierce competition from the private car, the supply of urban public
transport has increased significantly between 1992 and 1997 (see Table 2.1). However,
we should note the slight decrease of 0.4% in the intermediate size network category in
1997.
Table 2.2: Supply in Available Seat Kilometer per inhabitant of the PTU in 1997
Population 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Over 3,110 3,269 3,339 3,392 3,494 3,548
300,000
100,000 - 2,503 2,592 2,639 2,774 2,861 2,850
300,000
Less than 1,277 1,339 1,388 1,399 1,439 1,493
100,000
Source: Enquetes et Analyses 98, Transports Collectifs Urbains,
l'Equipement, des Transports et du Logement - CERTU (1998)
Annuaire Statistique, Ministere de
Whereas the ridership had declined since 1994, we observe a halt in this decline in
1997 with a slight increase from an average of 87.9 trip per inhabitant in 1996 to an
average of 88.1 in 1997 (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). However, the ridership in the networks
with population between 100,000 and 300,000 inhabitants decreased slightly (-1.2%) in
1997, which is in line with the decline observed in the supply for this network category.
Table 2.3: Ridership in Number of Trips per inhabitant in 1997
Population 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Over 126.1 128.6 128.1 125.7 123.6 124.5
300,000
100,000- 82.2 82.5 83.2 81.8 82.0 81.0
300,000
Less than 40.3 40.9 41.4 41.0 40.9 42.0
100,000
Source: Enquetes et Analyses 98, Transports Collectifs Urbains, Annuaire Statistique, Ministere de
l'Equipement, des Transports et du Logement - CERTU (1998)
The objective of the OAs to increase the urban public transport market share in
the transport provision market is increasingly influencing their behavior in the production
market. The OAs give priority to the quality of service over price during the selection of
the producer and in the contract structure through incentives schemes. We shall next
focus on the production market, which is the central interest of this thesis, by reviewing
the characteristics of both groups of actors in this market - the OA's and the operators -
and then describing the current trends in their contractual relationships.
2.2.2 The Organizing Authorities
There are currently around 240 urban public transport networks, and as many
OAs, in France. The "intercommunality rate", or rate of OAs that consist of a group of
communes, of 63% in 1998, keeps growing through an increase of the number of
Associations of communes and intercommunal syndicates (see Table 2.4).
Table 2.4: Status of the OAs in 1998
Form of Association of Communes Percentage
Communes 37%
Intercommunal syndicates 31%
Districts 17%
Mixed syndicates 6%
Associations of Communes and Cities 4%
Urban Communities 4%
New Towns Syndicates 1%
Source: GART - Enquete Annuelle Sur Les Transports Collectifs Urbains (CERTU-DTT-GART-UTP)
The OAs are financially largely independent of the State. In 1997, the average
share of the Versement de Transport in the financing of both urban public transport
investment and operation was 39% (FRF9.7 billion for all provincial networks), whereas
the local public authorities financed 36% (FRF8.8 billion) and the fare box revenue 23%
(FRF5.5 billion). The remainder of only 2%, was financed by the State.
In Table 2.5, which shows the distribution of networks by size, we can observe
that the large networks enjoy a higher ridership and recovery ratio than smaller networks
as would be expected. Table 2.6 shows some characteristics of the top five networks
(outside the Paris region and excluding Marseilles, which also has public production).
Table 2.5: Characteristics of Networks By Size in 1997 (133 networks, out of 240)
Population in Over Between Between Below All
PTU 300,000 100,000 and 50,000 and 50,000 Networks
300,000 100,000
of Networks 11 39 32 51 133
Trips per inhab. 128.1 81.0 49.3 32.1 90.2
Op. Rev. / Trip 3.3 3.0 2.4 2.4 3.1
Op. Costs/ Trip 6.7 6.7 6.4 7.3 6.7
Recovery Ratio 49.5 44.3 36.7 33.1 46.2
(Revenues and Costs in FRF)
Source: GART - Enquete Annuelle Sur Les Transports Collectifs Urbains 1998 (CERTU-DTT-GART-
UTP)
Table 2.6: Main Characteristics of Four Of The Five Largest Networks under Delegation
for 1997 (Data not available for Toulouse, which ranks #4)
Lyon Lille Bordeaux Nantes
OA status Mixed Synd. Mixed Synd. Urban Com. District
Population in PTU 1,152,297 1,079,493 633,823 505,281
Modes Metro and Metro, Tram Bus, Tram Tram and Bus
Bus and Bus being built
Number of Routes 99 n.a. 62 59
Total Length of Routes (km) 1,160 1,109 997 623
Vehicles 1,177 604 584 467
Staff 3,504 1,520 1,658 1,186
Total Trips (Thousand) 217,874 93,935 58,220 84,516
Total Trips km (Thousand) 54,094 29,078 22,433 18,421
Total ASK* 5,926,597 2,603,429 2,488,960 1,931,946
ASK per inhabitant 5,413 2,411 3,930 3,824
Trip per inhabitant 189.1 87.0 91.9 167.3
Operating Revenue (K FRF) 634,045 309,568 128,955 154,938
Operating Costs (K FRF) 1,356,046 646,758 552,874 383,065
Personnel Costs (K FRF) 907,310 n.a. 393,245 216,923
Operating cost/ 1000 trips 6.2 6.9 9.5 4.5
Operating costs /1000 km 25.1 22.2 24.6 20.8
Recovery Ratio** (%) 46.8 47.9 23.3 40.4
Basic Fare (FRF) 8.00 7.80 7.50 8.00
Operator (Group) VIA GTI VIA GTI CGEA Transdev
Source: GART -Enquete Annuelle Sur Les Transports Collectifs Urbains 1998 (CERTU-DTT-GART-
UTP)
* ASK: Available Seat Kilometer
** Recovery Ratio: Operating revenue / Operating Costs
2.2.3 The Operators
A special feature of the French urban public transport is the important role played
by the private sector in the operation of the urban public transport systems outside the
Paris region. A small number of private or semi-public companies operate the networks,
either directly, or indirectly through subsidiaries. Since1988, many takeovers have
occurred and, as a result, most of the urban public transport companies are now affiliated
with one of the three major groups: VIA GTI (VIA Generale de Transport et d'Industrie),
CGEA (Companie Generale des Eaux Automobiles), and TRANSDEV. In some cases,
these private companies participate in urban public transport under the form of semi-
public companies or SEM (Societes d'Economie Mixte).
The SEM are public-private joint ventures (under private law) in which the OA
typically holds between 51% and 80% of the share capital. The status of a private
company provides them with a freedom of action that is not available to public agencies
("regies"). The production of service is governed by a delegation contract between the
OA and the SEM. The nature of the SEM being clarified, we shall next present the three
major groups.
A subsidiary of the Compagnie de Navigation Mixte, VIA GTI runs 38% of the
networks, including Lyon, Lille, Tours, Rennes and Dijon. The group operates the
networks of two large agglomerations of over one million inhabitants with urban rail
systems in both. Lyon has a conventional metro system and an automatic metro (line D).
Lille has an automatic metro and a modern LRT system. In 1995, 46 networks out of the
59 in which VIA GTI was involved were operated by a private limited company. Of the
remainder, 11 networks are operated by an SEM. VIA GTI has a clear strategy of
expansion in foreign markets mainly through acquisitions and partnerships. VIA GTI is
present in Spain through Corporacion Espanola de Transporte S.A.(with FCC), in UK
through GOVIA (with Go Ahead), in Germany through Taeter Aachen GmbH (with
CGEA), and in Albania, Hungary, and Romania through Transtec (with CGEA) for
technical assistance contracts.
TRANSDEV is a subsidiary of the Caisse des Depots et Consignations, a public
financial institution. TRANSDEV operates around 18% of the networks, including
Grenoble, Nantes and Toulouse. TRANSDEV has two subsidiaries: TRANSCET which
is responsible for the urban transport activity, and PROGECAR in charge of the
interurban transport activity. In 1995, 18 out of the 32 networks in which TRANSDEV
was involved, were operated by an SEM in which TRANSCET has a minority
shareholding. Toulouse, the largest network operated by the group, has an automatic
metro. In addition, the group has been involved in the management of four LRT systems:
in Strasbourg, Nantes, Grenoble, and Saint Etienne. TRANSDEV is also active in foreign
markets, especially in LRT projects including Nottingham, UK (with Tarmac, ADTranz,
Nottingham City Transport) and Dublin, Ireland. In Spain, TRANSDEV has a partnership
agreement with TMB (Transpots Metropolitains Barcelone). Finally, TRANSDEV
provides technical assistance in Portsmouth, UK, in Buenos Aires, Argentina and in
several cities in Poland.
CGEA is wholly owned by the Vivendi group, which is the world-wide leader in
the water distribution sector. CGEA runs around 13% of the networks, notably Bordeaux,
Nancy, Rouen and Toulon. Set up in 1972, CGEA took over CGFTE (Companie
Generale Francaise des Transport et d'Entreprises) in 1988, CFTA in 1989, the Galienne
group in 1990, and the SPIT group ( Transport Industry Company) in 1992. Apart from a
LRT project in Rouen, CGEA operate only standard bus and trolleybus services, even in
Bordeaux, the largest network operated by the group. All the companies controlled by
CGEA are subsidiaries with the exception of two SEMs. CGEA is also involved in urban
public transport in other European countries. The group is present in Germany through
DEG (with EVS), and through Taeter Aachen GmbH (with VIA GTI), in UK through
Connex Rail Ltd, in Sweden through Linjebus (which has subsidiaries in Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, and Germany), in Portugal through Barraqueiro, in the Netherlands
through Lovers Rail, and in Albania, Hungary and Romania through Transtec (with VIA
GTI).
Table 2.7: The Top Three French Urban Public Transport Groups in 1996
VIA GTI TRANSDEV CGEA
Turnover (transport only) 4,987 4,300 11,500*
(in FRF million) I _ _
Staff (transport only) 20,590 11,320 20,590
Fleet 8,600 5,515 10,500*
Source: UITP-EuroTeam-January 1998 * Forecast for 1997
Beside the three major groups (see Table 2.7), there are two smaller groups:
CARIANE and VERNEY. Both operate medium sized and small networks, and were not
successful so far in their bids for large networks. The VERNEY group operates 7 small
networks (between 10,000 and 60,000 inhabitants) in the West of France. CARIANE
group, a subsidiary of SNCF set up in 1988, operates 5 networks, of which only one has a
population over 100,000 (Versailles). CARIANE is a stronger player in inter-city
transport, operating coach lines that replaced some abandoned SNCF rail lines.
Finally, the "Association pour la Gestion Independante des Reseaux de transport
public et l'amelioration des deplacements" (AGIR), set up in 1987, operates as an
independent manager of urban public transport networks. It operates 8 networks serving
populations over 100,000, and two networks serving populations over 200,000
(Clermont-Ferrand and Mulhouse).
2.2.4 The Contractual Relationship between the OA and the Operator
As discussed in section 2.1.2, the current regulation on delegation contracts is
rather flexible with a broad and diverse spectrum of contract type. Nonetheless, the
current contracts in French networks are traditionally classified into three types:
management contracts, operation contracts at a fixed price, and operation contracts with
financial compensation. This classification is based on the allocation of the production
risk and the commercial risk between the OA and the operator, as well as on the
remuneration method.
In the French context, as the OA usually owns the rolling stock, the production
risk is associated with the operation and maintenance of rolling stock and with the
management of labor only. The commercial risk is mainly the risk on the fare box
revenue, but can also include the risk on advertising revenue. Beside fare, which is fixed
by the OA, ridership is the other important element of the fare box revenue. Many factors
influence ridership. On the demand side, we have the evolution of mobility patterns and
purchasing power. On the supply side, the main factors are the quality of service and the
appropriateness of the service to the needs of the users.
Under a management contract, the OA assumes both operation risk and
commercial risk, and the operator brings his know-how on operations and technical
assistance. The staff is employed by the operator. This is a Cost Plus contract: the
operator collects the fare box revenue on behalf of the OA, and the OA reimburses the
operator all its actual operating expenses. The operator's fixed remuneration is calculated
based on the type and volume of service supplied. There is usually a system of bonuses or
penalties based on management performance.
Under an operation contract at a fixed price, the operator collects the fare box
revenue on behalf of the OA. The OA agrees to pay the operator a fixed price for each
year of the contract period, based on operating cost estimates. The operator therefore
bears the operation risk. This second category of contract usually includes a system of
bonuses and penalties that are based either on operating revenues or on the quality of
service and on ridership. Depending on the bonus and penalty formulae, the operator may
end up bearing a substantial portion of the commercial risk.
Under the last category, the operation contract with financial compensation, the
operator bears the full operating risk and part of the commercial risk, no longer through
bonus and penalty schemes, but based on the variance from the budgeted operating
revenues. Another difference with the contracts at a fixed price lies in the fact that under
a contract with financial compensation, the operator keeps the fare box revenue. The OA
then pays the operator compensation which is the expected operating deficit calculated
based on operating expenses and revenue forecasts. The difference between actual and
budgeted revenues may be split, evenly or not, between the OA and the operator. In the
last two categories, the commercial risk borne by the operator is usually capped. We shall
briefly illustrate this contract classification with a review of three examples.
In Toulon's management contract that covers the 7-year period between 1996 and
2002, the OA reimburses the operator all actual operating expenses. The operator's
remuneration also includes two elements: a fixed portion of FRF1,500,000 per annum,
which corresponds to an annual management fee and is increased or reduced by 10% of
the difference between the actual operating deficit and the contractual forecast. The
variable part, called management bonus, is calculated based on two indicators: the
number of kilometers run divided by hours worked, and ridership (according to our
interpretation of the French contract). The management bonus, paid on an annual basis,
equals FRF300,000 if both indicators are stable from one year to the next; it equals
FRF150,000 if one indicator decreases by more than 3% and is null if both indicators
decrease by more than 3%. Finally, a clause stipulates that the variation of the operator's
total remuneration cannot increase or decrease from one year to the next by more than
25%.
In Bordeaux, the OA has chosen a contract with a fixed price for the 5-year period
starting in 1996. Under this contract, the operator remuneration consists of two parts: a
fixed part and a variable part. The fixed part, called the fixed price, corresponds to
operating expenses necessary to achieve a certain level of supply of transport services
and a certain level of quality of service, both specified in detail in the contract. The
variable part is based on the achievement of goals in terms of fare box revenue. The fixed
price is calculated for each year (FRF498 million for 1996) and specified in the contract,
as well as the total price for the 5-year period (FRF2.487 billion). The variable part is
based on the difference between the actual and the targeted fare box revenue. Within a
variation of 1% around the target, the difference is fully borne by the operator. If the
variation is between 1% and 2.5%, the operator's share on the revenue difference falls to
30%. For a variation above 2.5%, the operator's incentive is biased as his share on the
revenue difference is 20% in case of a revenue surplus (bonus), but is null in case of a
revenue deficit.
In the Rennes district, the delegation contract recently signed between the OA and
the operator for the period 1999-2005 is a contract with financial compensation. The
contract defines in detail the service supply expected from the operator. Moreover, the
operator has the flexibility to modify the service supply within a range of 3% with no
change in the amount of the compensation. The operator is remunerated by the fares
collected and by compensation, which is calculated for each of the 7 years (FRF141
million in 1999). Another portion of the operator's remuneration is based on the
difference between the actual and forecast fare box revenue. For variation of less than
6%, the operator bears full commercial risk. Between 6% and 10%, the operator bears
50% of the commercial risk. Beyond 10%, the parties renegotiate the financial outcome
of the contract.
Table 2.8: Commercial Risk Sharing in the Bordeaux Contract
Actual fare box Variance of fare Operator's share OA's share
revenue box revenue
142.6 +10% +3.9 +9.1
136.1 +5% +2.6 +3.9
132.8 +2.5% +1.9 +1.3
130.9 +1% +1.3 -
129.6 Target - -
128.3 -l% -1.3-
126.4 -2.5% -1.9 -1.3
123.1 -5% -1.9 -4.6
116.6 -10% -1.9 -11.1
(in FRF million)
Table 2.9: Commercial Risk Sharing in the Rennes Contract
Actual fare box Variance of fare Operator's share OA's share
revenue box revenue
> 87.9 > +10% Re-negotiation
87.9 +10% +6.4 +1.6
84.7 +6% +4.8 -
79.9 Target --
75.1 -6% -4.8 -
71.9 -10% -6.4 -1.6
< 71.9 > -10% Re-negotiation
(in FRF million)
These three examples provide a sense of the broad diversity that can be found in
the contracts in the French urban public transport networks, especially in terms of risk
sharing. In particular, even though both the Bordeaux and Rennes contracts include a
system of bonuses and penalties related to fare box revenue, different settings of the
ranges and sharing formulae have significantly different results in terms of commercial
risk borne by the operator (substantial in Rennes, low in Bordeaux) (see Tables 2.8 and
2.9).
Table 2.10: Distribution of Contracts Types 1993-1997
Contract Type 1993 1997
Management Contract 27% 22%
Operation Contract At A Fixed Price 35% 35%
Operation Contract With Financial Compensation 34% 41%
Other Contracts4% 2%
Source: GART -Enquete Annuelle Sur Les Transports Collectifs Urbains 1998 (CERTU-DTT-GART-
UTP), Ministere de l'Equipement, des Transports et du Logement (1995)
As shown in table 2.10, there is a clear trend towards more contracts with
financial compensation and less management contracts. This trend can be explained by
the increasing desire of the OA's to transfer some portion of the risk to the operator,
mainly with the objective of having better control over its long-term financial planning. A
judgement by the Supreme Court in 1996 ("Arrete du Prefet des Bouches-du-Rhone")
may further enhance this trend, as it states that a delegation contract, in order to qualify
for the DSP procedure (or Sapin Law procedure), should be structured in such a way that
the operator's remuneration is "substantially" based on the operating revenue.
Despite its rather vague formulation and the difficulty of application due to the
diversity of contracts, this judgement may have some consequences on the contracting
practices. In 1997, a little bit less than 50% of the delegation contracts integrated a
variable portion of the operator's remuneration based on economic incentives (on
ridership or fare box revenue for example). Yet, in most networks, this variable portion is
not significant with respect to the global remuneration of the contract (e.g. refer to
Bordeaux contract). Finally, this judgement has had, so far, very little impact on OA's
choice of the tendering procedure: out of the 28 urban public transport contracts renewed
in 1998, only one followed the public market law (Menton).
In this chapter, we have seen that the French tendering system is indeed a variant of
the limited competition model, with the responsibility for urban public transport given to
organizing authorities by the LOTI in 1982, and the obligation to organize a tendering for
any delegation of service introduced by the Sapin law in 1993. It is worthwhile noting
that a feature that could inhibit competition maximization, has been introduced in the
French system. The labor law L212-12, by requiring the new incumbent operator to
renew the contracts of all employees, has the effect of reducing significantly the scope of
items on which operators can differentiate themselves from their rivals, and therefore on
which the operators can actually compete.
Beside this constraint, we have also noted that the urban public transport industry is
highly concentrated. For the above reasons, we may wonder whether the tenders
organized in the French networks are truly competitive. We shall investigate this question
in the next chapter.
Chapter 3: Degree of Competition in Tendering in the French
Networks
As seen in Section 2.1, the principle of competition was introduced in the French
urban public transport system starting in 1993, when the Sapin law imposed a tendering
procedure for any delegation of service. Despite the diffuse feeling that there is little
competition, the actual degree of competition in the French market and its underlying
factors remain, to a large extent, to be investigated. In this chapter, we shall first evaluate
the performance of the French tendering procedure in bringing competition in the
selection of the delegatee. For this purpose, we shall provide and analyze the results of
two surveys on tenders in the French networks. We shall then make several hypotheses
on the factors, regulatory and non-regulatory, influencing the outcomes of tendering
procedures, hence the degree of competition in the market. In the last section, the
tendering procedure used in London, where another form of "limited competition" model
has been applied, will be briefly described, together with its outcome.
3.1 Survey on the degree of competition in French tendering
3.1.1 Methodology
The objectives of any tendering process are to improve the quality of service and
push the price down by creating competition during the bidding process. In the French
system, there is a second phase in the competition which involves negotiation with the
selected bidders. The tendering process will therefore be really effective only when the
OA receives several bids. If only one bid is submitted, the OA's bargaining position
during the negotiation phase with the sole bidder will inevitably be weak. In this case,
according to the Sapin law, the OA's only leverage over the sole candidate is to declare
the negotiation unsuccessful and either start direct negotiations with several companies
(for example the case of Lille) or decide to establish a public agency (regie, EPIC) in
order to produce service (for example the case of La Rochelle). In order to evaluate the
performance of a tender, we shall therefore use three indicators: the number of candidates
in the qualification round, the number of bids submitted, and the tendering outcome i.e.
the rate of renewal of the incumbent operator.
In 1996 the CERTU carried out a survey on the effects of the Sapin Law on
tendering practices in the French networks. Although its results are interesting and will be
summarized shortly, this survey has the following shortcomings. First, it was carried out
just two years after the promulgation of the Sapin law, so that not all networks had used
the new procedure at that time. Second, it included all OAs disregarding their size, and
resulted in a network sample lacking homogeneity. Third, it was based on a questionnaire
and suffered a low response rate.
Therefore, for this thesis we conducted a new survey on the tendering process in
the French networks but adopted a different methodology. First, we decided not to survey
small networks, as we thought they would be less attractive for the large operating groups
and expected little competition in these tenders, especially from foreign companies.
Furthermore, the large OA's generally have more in-house technical competence and
may have a better ability to organize the tendering procedure so as to optimize the degree
of competition. For these reasons, we focused on the networks of agglomerations with
population over 200,000.
Another departure from the strategy followed by the CERTU is that our main
source in this new survey consists of official documents: the minutes of the deliberations
of the OA ratifying the delegation of the network for the new period. This document
summarizes the outcomes of the tendering procedure, from the call for tender until the
final negotiation with the seleted candidates. We also conducted interviews at the
Ministry of Transport, at the GART (Groupement des Autorites Responsables de
Transport) and the UTP (Union des Transports Publics), respectively the OAs and the
operators' national associations, and with a set of OAs, either selected (Bordeaux, Lyon)
or fortuitous (Toulon, Nantes, Lens-Lievin). We shall next present the results of the
CERTU survey, followed by those of the second survey conducted for the purpose of this
thesis.
3.1.2 Results of the CERTU Survey
This survey was launched in July 1995 and covers the period from September 1993
until July 1995. Its aims were to describe the outcome of the tendering process and to
measure the impact of the Sapin law on contract renewals. Out of the 46 OAs that had
renewed their delegation under the Sapin procedure, 23 of them replied to the
questionnaire sent by the CERTU. The 23 OAs responding are generally not very large:
10 have populations below 50,000 inhabitants, 6 have populations between 50,000 and
100,000 inhabitants, and 6 have populations over 100,000. Most of the OAs (18 out of
23) initiated the tendering procedure in 1994 and completed it either by the end of 1994
or early 1995. The average length of the procedure was 9 months and for 5 of them, the
procedure took 6 months or less. In the pre-qualification round, the most frequent number
of applicants is 3, found in 7 networks out 22, as shown on the Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Number of Applications Received for the Pre-Qualification Round (sample of
22 networks)
Number of applications 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 >6
Number of networks 0 1 3 7 4 2 3 2
Source: CERTU (1997)
The ranking of the groups who submitted an application in 20 calls for tenders is
the same as those qualified by the OAs. There are generally few rejections of applications
as 15 OAs did not reject any application, two OAs rejected one application, and one OA
rejected two applications (see Table 3.2). The English group SOUTHERN VECTIS
submitted an application in 3 calls for tenders (Chateauroux, Epernay, and Le Puy) and
was qualified in two of them.
Table 3.2: Number of Applications after Rejections and Withdrawals
Group Number of After OAs
applications selection and
withdrawals
VIA GTI 16 13
CGEA 14 13
CARIANE 13 11
TRANSDEV 10 9
VERNEY 7 6
AGIR 4 3
SOUTHERN VECTIS 3 2
Source: CERTU (1997)
The period of time left to the operators to prepare their bids is rather
homogeneous as 13 OAs left a period of 31 to 60 days, and 6 OAs left them a period of
61 to 90 days. The selection criteria mentioned to the applicants are by descending
ranking: costs, technical expertise (especially on fleet renewal), financial resources,
references, policy on ridership growth, human resources, policy on supply improvement,
current knowledge of the network, legal resources, relationships between the operator and
the OA, policy on quality, compliance with the notion of public service, policy on
communication (internal, external). It is worth noting that for 15 OAs, the main concern
is cost.
For half of the 23 OAs surveyed, there were two bids submitted (see Table 3.3)
with only one third received more than two bids. There was no competition right from the
start for 3 OAs who received only one bid (Bar-Le Duc, Limoges, Roanne).
Table 3.3: Number of Bids Received (sample of 23 networks)
Number of bids 0 1 2 3 4 5 >6_]
Number of networks 0 3 13 1 4 2 0
Source: CERTU (1997)
Table 3.4: Number of Bids Submitted (sample of 20 networks)
Group Number of final Number of bids
applications submitted
VIA GTI 13 13
CGEA 13 10
TRANSDEV 9 7
CARIANE 11 6
VERNEY 6 3
AGIR 3 2
SOUTHERN VECTIS 2 2
Total 57 43
Source: CERTU (1997)
Clearly between the application and bid submission stages, some operators pull
out, especially CARIANE (minus 5), CGEA (minus 3) and VERNEY (minus 3) (see
Table 3.4). Only 3 OAs rejected some bids as being invalid. The selection criteria
actually used by the OAs to select the operators for the negotiation phase (based on only
11 replies) are slightly different from those mentioned earlier: costs still come first,
followed by the policy on improvement of supply, and the policy on increase of ridership.
Out of 17 replies, 4 OAs received only one valid bid. For the others, 12 OAs
received bids with a small range of cost variation (less than 10%). Out of 18 replies, 10
OAs conducted a final negotiation with only one candidate, and 8 OAs conducted a final
negotiation with 2 candidates. No OA negotiated with more than 2 candidates.
Table 3.5: Number of Negotiations (sample of 18 networks)
Group Number of bids Number of
submitted negotiations
VIA GTI 13 11
CGEA 10 4
TRANSDEV 7 4
CARIANE 6 2
VERNEY 3 1
AGIR 2 1
SOUTHERN VECTIS 2 0
Source: CERTU (1997)
Despite its two bids, SOUTHERN VECTIS was not invited to participate in any
negotiation. In contrast with other groups, VIA GTI maintained a strong presence at both
the bid and the final negotiation stages. The selection criteria during the negotiation are
the following. The operating costs are still the main concern but are no longer governing
in all cases (only 9 OAs out of 12). Once the issue of cost is agreed upon, the OA wants
to make sure that the operator has the technical expertise to provide the desired service (6
OAs) and reach the targeted level of ridership (5 OAs).
In only one case, the OA had to declare the tendering process unsuccessful and
engage in direct negotiation. As a result of the tendering, two OAs out of 20 changed
their operators: Annemasse' network delegation was transferred from AGIR to VIA GTI,
and that of Douai from CGEA to CARIANE.
From their appraisal of their existing contract, half of the OAs (out of 12 replies)
concluded that the operator should bear more responsibility. 7 out of 14 OAs clearly
mentioned as objectives the control of costs, and the improvement of supply and
ridership. 15 out of 23 OAs have modified their contracts, of which half have changed in
the areas of exchange of information and quality monitoring.
When asked about their experience under the Sapin law, 9 OAs out of 16 found
the procedure too complex and demanding; 7 OAs found it too lengthy. On the positive
side, 6 OAs think that the procedure creates the desired level of transparency in the
delegation of service; and 6 OAs mention that it stimulated a review of the network and
new actions for its improvement.
In conclusion, the tendering in this survey show a low level of competition with 4
out 17 OA's receiving one bid, and the majority of the remainder receiving two bids.
3.1.3 Results of the 1999 Survey
A new survey was undertaken in June 1999 as part of this thesis research, and as
already mentioned, was mainly based on the minutes of the OA's deliberations on the
delegation of service. We can see from Table 3.6 that 17 out of the 29 networks with a
population over 200,000 have now undergone a tendering procedure as prescribed by the
Sapin law. The tendering in these networks has therefore taken place between March
1993 and December 1998, especially in the last three years as 12 contracts were renewed
in 1998 or 1999 (see Table 3.7). In this sample, 12 out of the 17 networks have a
population between 200,000 and 400,000 inhabitants (see Table 3.8).
Table 3.6: Networks with a PTU Population over 200,000 Inhabitants
Network Population Production type Contract Contract Contract type
beg date End date
Networks that were delegated under the Sapin Law
1 ANGERS 250,910 Delegation 1/1/98 12/31/04 Fixed Price
2 BORDEAUX 640,025 Delegation 1/1/96 12/31/00 Fixed Price
3 DIJON 235,029 Delegation 1/1/98 12/31/02 Management
4 HAVRE (LE) 244,523 Delegation 1/1/97 12/31/05 Financial Compensation
5 JOUE LES TOURS 268,500 Delegation 1/1/98 12/31/03 Management
6 LENS-LIEVIN 251,535 Delegation 1/1/94 12/31/98 Financial Compensation*
7 LILLE 1,065,595 Delegation 1/1/93 6/30/98 Fixed Price*
8 LYON 1,134,689 Delegation 1/1/93 12/31/98 Fixed Price*
9 MONTPELLIER 282,259 Delegation 1/1/98 12/31/03 Financial Compensation
10 MULHOUSE 209,686 Delegation 1/1/98 12/31/02 Fixed Price
I NANCY (GRAND) 264,854 Delegation 1/1/97 12/31/01 Financial Compensation
12 NANTES 564,419 Delegation 1/1/98 12/31/02 Management
13 ORLEANS 249,359 Delegation 8/1/94 7/31/04 Financial Compensation
14 RENNES 331,752 Delegation 1/1/94 1/1/02 Financial Compensation
15 TOULON 298,507 Delegation 1/1/96 12/30/02 Management
16 TOULOUSE 631,579 Delegation 1/1/99 12/31/03 Financial Compensation
17 TOURS 272,397 Delegation 1/1/98 Management
Networks that were not delegated under the Sapin Law
18 BREST 213,838 Delegation 1/1/92 12/31/03 Financial Compensation
19 CLERMONT-F. 235,995 Delegation 1/1/92 12/31/00 Management
20 DUNKERQUE 208,580 Delegation 1/1/94 12/31/98 Management *
21 GRENOBLE 373,466 Delegation 1/1/75 1/1/06 Fixed Price
22 NICE 338,486 Delegation 3/23/90 12/31/01 Financial Compensation
23 REIMS 212,036 Delegation 1/1/93 12/31/99 Financial Compensation
24 ROUEN 392,243 Delegation 7/1/93 12/31/25 Financial Compensation
25 SAINT-ETIENNE 316,262 Delegation 1/1/88 12/31/00 Management
26 STRASBOURG 429,928 Delegation 1/1/91 12/31/20 Financial Compensation
27 VALENCIENNES 334,671 Delegation 2/22/93 12/31/99 Fixed Price
28 MARSEILLES 807,726 Public (EPIC) I None
Source: GART Contract database
Table 3.7: Networks by Year of Contract Renewal
Year Of Contract Renewal 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Number of Networks 1 0 2 2 9 3
Source: GART Database
Table 3.8: Networks by Population Size
Population Size Number of Networks
200,001 - 400,000 12
400,001 - 600,000 1
600,001 -800,000 2
800,001 - 1,000,000 0
Over 1,000,000 2
Source: GART Database
We obtained the
are therefore based on a
the whole population.
minutes from 14 out of 17 OAs and the results presented below
sample of 14 OAs, which can be considered as representative of
Table 3.9: Number of Applications Received for the Qualification Round (out of a
sample of 12 OA's)
Number ofApplications 0 1 2 3 4
Number of Networks 0 0 1 9 2
Source: Minutes of the OAs Deliberations on the delegation of services
In the qualification round, the most frequent number of applicants is 3 as shown
in Table 3.9. The three major groups are well represented in the ranking by number of
applications (see Table 3.10). We also note applications from two British groups:
ARRIVA (in Lyons), and GO AHEAD (in Toulouse).
Table 3.10: Ranking of Applicants by Number of Applications
Group Number of Number of
Applications Rejections
VIA GTI 11 0
TRANSDEV 11 0
CGEA 7 0
CARIANE 3 1
VERNEY 1 0
GO AHEAD 1 0
ARRIVA 1 0
Source: Minutes of the OAs Deliberations on the delegation of services
Table 3.11: Number of Bids Received
Number of bids 0 1 2 >3
Number of networks 0 10 4 0
Source: Minutes of the OAs Deliberations on the delegation of services
The big surprise of this survey came with the number of networks having received
only one bid (all from the incumbent): 10 networks out of 14 (see Table 3.11). The other
4 networks received only two bids. This latter result occurs in large part as a result of
VIA GTI's expansion strategy, bidding against the incumbents in Bordeaux, Toulouse,
and Rennes, (against CGEA in Bordeaux, and TRANSDEV in the last two).
TRANSDEV contested the delegation to CGEA in Toulon. Only VIA GTI was
successful in any of these rare offensives and then only once: in Rennes.
Less surprisingly, the bids are mostly submitted by the three large groups (see
Table 3.12). Again, VIA GTI is the only large operator to submit bids on the great
majority of its applications. It is interesting to note that the two small French groups,
CARIANE and VERNEY, and the two British groups, GO AHEAD and ARRIVA, did
not submit a bid although they were qualified. The only independent operator who
(successfully) submitted a bid was the Societe Montpellieraine de Transport Urbain
(SMTU) in Montpellier (we do not have any information regarding the qualification
round for this network; however we know that SMTU's bid was the only one received).
Table 3.12: Number of Bids Submitted (out of a sample of 14 networks)
Group Number of Number of bids Number of
applications submitted networks won
VIA GTI 11 8 6
TRANSDEV 11 5 4
CGEA 7 4 4
CARIANE 2 0 0
SMTU1 1 1
VERNEY 1 0 0
GOAHEAD 1 0 0
ARRIVA 1 0 0
Total 35 18 15
Source: Minutes of the OAs Deliberations on the delegation of services
We can conclude that the level of competition in the 14 tendering processes
surveyed is exceptionally low with 10 out 14 networks being forced to conduct the final
negotiation with the existing operator only. We shall next analyze the results of the two
surveys and look for explanations for this poor performance.
3.2 Analysis
Two observations can be made from the two surveys. The first one is that there
are only a few significant active operators in the French urban public transport production
market. The second observation is that these few players do not compete actively.
Table 3.13: Number of Groups in the Market and Average Number of Applications and
Bids
CERTU Survey Second Survey
# of networks surveyed 23 14
# of groups in the bidding phase 7 4
Average # of applications received 3.9 3.1
Average # of bids received 2.3 1.3
Source: CERTU (1997) and Minutes of the OAs Deliberations on the delegation of services
3.2.1 Few Players in the Market
In order to get an idea of the number of potential producers of urban public
transport service in France, we may consider the qualified applicants. In the CERTU
survey, the French groups are the three largest groups, CARIANE, VERNEY, and some
local transport companies (found in 5 networks out of 23; of which 3 received the
delegation contract). We also find the British group SOUTHERN VECTIS, which
focuses on small and medium-size networks.
In the second survey, we find the five national groups but hardly any local
companies. The British groups showing some interested in the large French networks are
ARRIVA and GO AHEAD (with one application each). Overall, we cannot currently
expect more than 7 potential producers whether it be in small and medium-size networks
(including one local producer) or in the large ones. This small number of observed
potential producers is due, first, to the concentration wave that took place in the French
urban public transport industry since the late 1980's, and second, to the little interest
shown so far by foreign companies in the French market.
3.2.2 Lack of Competitive Behavior
Nevertheless, not all the potential producers submit applications. The CERTU
surveys shows an average of 3.9 applications per network and the second survey shows
an average of 3.1 applications per network. Furthermore, even fewer groups submit bids
for network, with an average of 2.3 in CERTU survey and of 1.3 in the new survey. The
rejection of some applications - 4 rejections in CERTU survey and one in the new survey
- does not explain the drop in the number of participants between the application phase
and the bidding phase. Heavy workloads and commitments in other networks and a lack
of information to assess the risks involved are reasons frequently invoked by the
operators. We can observe a lack of competitive behavior from the operators as they tend
to bid only in the networks where they are the incumbent; as a result, many OAs receive
only one bid (in 10 networks out of 14 in the second survey) and are in a weak bargaining
position to begin the negotiation round.
3.2.3 Explanations
There are several possible reasons for the small number of bidders in the French
tendering system and their lack of competitive behavior. In our survey and interviews, we
found some support for the following four explanations: information asymmetries, high
tendering costs, high operation risks, and the OA's perceived failure to conduct a fair
selection. However, before presenting these four explanations, it is appropriate to
mention here the significant impact of labor law L122-12 on the number of bidders and
their lack of competitive behavior.
As seen in Chapter 2, labor law L122-12 aims to protect the staff of urban public
transport companies from the instability created by frequent tendering of the service
delegation. To this end, law L122-12 imposes the renewal of all existing employment
contracts at the beginning of any new delegation contract period. Let us see why this
constraint is likely to have a significant impact on the way potential bidders assess their
chance of defeating the incumbent in relation with the cost of preparing a bid. Staff
expenses usually account for about 70% of the total operating expenses (in 1997: 71.1%
in Bordeaux, 66.9% in Lyons, and 70.2% in Dijon). The selection of the staff and of their
number for each function in the company which will produce the urban public transport
service is a management decision that has a strong impact on the staff expenses and the
quality and quantity of service, therefore on efficiency. If the delegatee is not allowed to
make this management decision, we can consider most of the staff expenses as being
"frozen" and not subject to competition. The operator who aims to defeat the incumbent
by proposing a better offer (a lower price for a similar service or higher quality of service
with the same price) will have to look for potential improvements in the management of
areas other than personnel. The scope of management issues on which bid differentiation
from rivals, and especially from the incumbent, is possible, corresponds to only about
30% of the operating costs. This may convince many potential bidders that their chance
of defeating the incumbent is rather low relative to the cost of preparing a bid, and finally
may deterred them from bidding.
Therefore, labor law L122-12 has a great impact on the level of competition that
can be achieved, which is likely to be far from the levels observed in London (see next
section), where such a constraint on labor management does not exist. We shall next
describe the four non-regulatory reasons, whose impact on competition may be smaller
than that of law L122.12.
The information asymmetry between the incumbent and the potential entrants,
and between the incumbent and the OA, was often mentioned in the interviews. Several
OAs' representatives are aware that the information provided to the potential bidders is
far from sufficient to prepare a competitive bid, and in particular often lacks operation
statistics, that could be best provided by indicators monitored by the operator. This
reason is officially cited in the minutes 98.257/2 of the deliberation of Lyons syndicate:
"The British firm ARRIVA did not think it had found in the elements at the disposition of
SYSTRAL (Lyons's OA) all the necessary information to assess the various risks implied
by the operation of a network of this size."
The second reason often given in interviews is that high tendering costs often
deter small companies and potential entrants in general. In the CERTU survey, 9 OAs out
of 16 complained that the Sapin procedure is too "demanding and complex". Isotope
mentions more precisely the high tendering costs in France. For instance, from interviews
we conducted, the bidding cost for a network the size of Bordeaux is estimated to be
between FRF 500,000 to FRF 1 million or even more, and that for Lyons, the tendering
cost is estimated to be between FRF 2 to 3 millions or more. Some OAs, aware of this
problem, have considered implementing a mechanism to reimburse the costs of those
who submitted an unsuccessful bid. However, this policy has several drawbacks such as a
difficulty of implementation and uncontrollable financial liabilities for the OAs.
A third reason mentioned in the interviews is high operating risks. The tendering
of the whole network, in contrast with the tendering on a route-basis in London or on
route or sub-network basis in Sweden and Denmark, contribute to this risk. Obviously,
the operation of a route involves less risk than the operation of a whole network.
Similarly, a network with only buses represent less risk than a network where the
delegatee has to manage the operation of bus, tramway and metro modes all together.
Surprisingly, the OAs' representatives do not consider tendering on a network basis to be
a problem. This concern is however expressed by most non-French experts interviewed
on the subject. In the CERTU survey, the OAs are small and the number of single-bids is
low, whereas in the second survey where OAs are all over 200,000, the number of single
bid is high. This observation supports the idea that the size of the areas tendered out are
too big in the larger urban areas.
Beside network size and multi-modality, the contract type is often cited as a
decisive factor, and as noted in section 2.3, there is actually a trend away from
management contracts and towards operation contracts with financial compensation,
which means more risk transfer from the OA to the operator. Both reasons are, for
instance, mentioned in the minutes 98.257/2 of the deliberation of Lyons syndicate: "The
company TRANSDEV, did not wish to submit a bid arguing of the difficulty to assess the
operation risks in such extensive a network, and in view of the strong commitments
requested in the risks taking on costs and operating revenues."
For the tenders organized in 1998 (10 out of 18), there was an additional
operating risk: the desire of several OAs that the operator implement a new social law,
the "loi des 35 heures" - which will impose a maximum annual average of 35 work hours
per week, expected to come into force in 2001 - and bear the risks of additional costs.
This risk, although substantial, is temporary as it arises from the uncertainty on the
impact of the new law on labor costs.
A fourth and last reason for the low degree of competition in the French tendering
system, is the OA's failure to establish a fair and transparent selection process and the
operators' perception of this failure. This reason is considered by a British bidder,
interviewed by telephone, as the key problem. Indeed, the OA has the option of using the
"intuitu personae" in the selection of the operator. Intuitu personae provides the OA with
the necessary flexibility to base its judgement on non quantitative factors, which is
important if the OA has objectives in terms of quality of service. This means more
flexibility than a low bid selection system, but more risks of subjectivity in the bid
appraisal process. The OAs are also criticized, sometimes by their own staff, for
discriminatory specifications in their tenders. The most representative example of such
specification is the obligation set by some OAs to keep the structure of SEM (semi-public
company). Although VIA GTI has developed some expertise in this field, TRANSDEV is
the specialist of the SEM's. Foreign operators are at great disadvantage, as the SEM
structure is a feature specific to France.
In this section, five factors for the lack of competition in the French market have been
identified. One factor is regulatory, labor law L122-12, and the other four are non-
regulatory: information asymmetries, high tendering costs, high operation risks, and the
OA's perceived failure to conduct a fair selection. What are the relationships between the
number of bidders, their competitive behavior, the above five factors and the degree of
competition in the market? In the last section of this chapter, we shall gather evidence on
these issues from another, well-documented, "limited competition" regime, the London
bus tendering.
3.3 The London Experience in Bus Service Tendering
In contrast with the policy followed for the UK outside London, urban public
transport in the capital city was not deregulated, and, in 1985, the service on minor routes
in suburban areas was submitted to competitive tendering. Progressively, trunk routes and
high-frequency services in central London were also tendered, so that, in April 1994, the
service directly operated by the public monopoly London Buses Limited (LBL)
accounted for less than half the network. In December 1994, the privatization of LBL and
its recasting into12 area companies were completed, and the route-by-route tendering
procedure was extended to the whole network. More precisely, a competitive tender was
organized for each route upon expiry of the existing negotiated cost contract. As a result,
the rate of contracting has been increased to about 20% of the network each year since
1994, and in 1997/98, some 100 routes (22% of the network) were tendered.
Thanks to large cost reductions, mainly achieved through renegotiating wages and
working conditions, LBL companies originally retained about half the routes put out to
competitive tender. Competition was fierce, with bids from small private companies and
regional companies, such as Kentish Bus and London & Country (both now parts of the
Arriva group), originally in the public sector and operating around the Greater London.
When compared with the deregulated system prevailing in the areas outside London, the
tendering system in London achieved better financial performance, as the lower cost
reduction in London was more than compensated by a smaller loss in ridership.
Consequently, the net public subsidy fell by 55% between 1985/86 and 1993/94 in areas
outside London, but by 72% in London.
London Transport (LT) plays the role of the "organizing authority". According to
the London Regional Transport Act 1984, LT is responsible for the provision of public
passenger transport services for Greater London. LT has regard to the transport needs of
Greater London and the efficiency, economy and safety of its operation. London
Transport Buses (LTB), LT's bus division, secures the provision of public bus services
through a competitive tendering process, which aims to encourage fair and sustainable
competition. The key features of this tendering system are as follows (London Transport
Buses, 1999 a). The contracts are designed to provide incentive to operators to improve
quality and increase patronage. Although it can vary from 3 to 7 years, the contract
duration is normally 5 years. Tenders are evaluated on the basis of "value for money"
with particular emphasis on quality and safety. Contract payments are related to the
mileage operated. Finally, there is a comprehensive quality measurement system
(currently being upgraded).
LTB currently secures bus services under two basic contract types: "gross cost"
contracts, where commercial risks are borne by LTB, and "net cost" contracts, where
operators bear commercial risks, in that a net sum (the difference between costs and
projected revenue) is paid to, or received from, operators.
LT is now dealing with several issues that arose from the decision in 1997 to use
"net cost" contracts (for the second time, after an unsuccessful attempt in 1994). One
issue is the apportionment of revenue between routes and operators with Smart Card
technology expected to meet most of the underlying technical challenges. Another issue
is the interdependence of routes with parallel segments. A change of scheduling on one
route may affect the revenue on the other, and hence both net cost contracts would
require modification. Another issue is degree of freedom given to operators to modify the
service on their routes.
Even more relevant to our study, the option of contracting services not on a route
basis but over a larger area, such as a group of routes over the same corridor or a small
network (for example, routes into a suburban shopping center) is being considered. This
approach would reduce the problems of revenue allocation, and would enable the transfer
to the operator of more responsibility for marketing and service planning. In White's
opinion, this option is not convincing and he argues that "if contracts were based on
larger areas in this form, the bidding process could become less competitive, as smaller
firms might be unable to take on the scale of work involved". There is ground for this
concern about the degree of competition in the bidding process, as the average number of
bids submitted at each tender fell from 7 in early 1995 to about 3 bids in late 1996
(White, 1998).
Table 3.14: London Bus Service Market Shares by Group (market share on LTB
contracted mileage, excluding Commercial Section 3.2 routes)
Group Market share Cumulative (%)
at 4 Jan 1999 (%)
Arriva 22.2 22.2
First Group 16.5 38.7
Stagecoach 16.3 55.0
Go-Ahead 16.1 71.1
Metroline Travel 12.6 83.7
London United 7.8 91.5
13 other operators 8.5 100
Source: London Transport Buses (1999, b)
A recent study conducted by London Transport Buses (1999, b) provides details
on the current situation of the market. Increased concentration of the industry has resulted
from mergers and acquisitions which have occurred since LBL privatization in 1994. The
five largest groups currently share 83.7% of the London market (see Table 3.14).
The Monopoly and Merger Commission concluded in an inquiry report into
takeover of British Bus by Cowie (now part of Arriva) in 1996 that LTB should give
greater emphasis to long-term considerations such as competition in the capital, the
tendering and allocations of blocks of routes and the encouragement and promotion of a
more diverse range of operators. LTB confirms that "there is need for a robust market of
several medium sized to large firms capable of maintaining competition. To this end LTB
encourages new operators to enter the market and will continue to sustain and enhance
competition to improve both quality and delivery of bus services to the public" (London
Transport Buses, 1999 b). LTB notes that, as they have neither the resources nor the
facilities to undertake the operation of large routes, small operators start by only
competing for small or medium-sized routes.
The number of bids per tender declined from around 6.7 in the first half of 1995
to a bottom of around 2.3 in the first half of 1997. Then, there was a slight rise to 3.3 bids
per tender in the last half of 1998 (London Transport Buses, 1999 b). Moreover, it
appears that there is a relationship between the number of bids and the average cost per
peak vehicle. Indeed, where there are few bids, costs tend to be higher (see Table 3.15).
Table 3.15: Relationship between Average Cost per Peak Vehicle and Number of Bids
per area.
Area Average cost (%) Average number of bids
South West +6.8 1.9
South +0.4 2.4
North East +1.1 2.7
North West -5.7 2.9
South West -2.6 3.7
Note: Cost per peak is the contract cost divided by the highest number of vehicles in services at any one
time.
Source: London Transport Buses (1999)
LTB identifies two major barriers to entry in the London market. The first barrier
is the lack of suitable garage premises. However LTB considers that the nature of the
tender program, which contracts out around 20% of the network each year - requiring
approximately 1,220 buses - facilitates incremental growth. Another barrier to entry is
the shortage of drivers, and some operators put this forward as a reason for not bidding
for new work.
White cites various reasons for the decline of the number of bids per tender (until
1998). The first reason is that bus operation has relied on a pool of cheap labor, which
tends to disappear as the economy improves. Other reasons are the further consolidation
among operators, and the deterrent effect of net cost contracts on small operators, as
found in areas outside London. However, we can conclude that the tendering based on
individual route contract tends to produce greater competition than tendering on a
network-basis as found in France.
Finally, the costs of contracts for tendered bus services in London have tended to
increase faster than the rate of inflation since 1997. LTB proposes several explanations
for this trend. The net cost contracts transfer risks to operators; a cost element associated
with this risk is obviously built into tendered prices. The increasing volume of tendering
has meant that the opportunity to bid on a marginal cost basis is reduced and operators
bid now on a full or average cost basis. The number of bidders has decreased. The
operators costs have increased, especially wages. Operators have introduced new, more
accessible vehicles, incorporating new features. A final explanation for increased
tendered prices is the increasing pressure on bus contractors to improve overhead
recovery and profit.
Overall, the London tendering system has improved service provision and
achieved costs reduction. However, LTB has had to respond to the industry consolidation
that took place since 1995, by encouraging competition and entry of new operators to the
market.
In conclusion, this chapter has provided evidence that there are only few players
in the markets for urban public transport services in the French networks, and that they do
not engage heavily in competitive behavior. A comparison between the CERTU survey
and the 1999 survey suggests that this problem is more acute in the large networks. A
review of the London bus tendering system suggested that the London system achieves
more competition than the French tendering system. This may be explained by the
differences in the regulatory framework such as the labor law on employment contracts
renewal. LTB's efforts to encourage entry of new operators may be another explanation.
Indeed, the London bus tendering experience highlights the importance of
encouraging new operators to enter the market so that a robust market of several medium
sized to large firms can develop, and provides evidence of the relationship between the
number of bidders and the contract price.
Finally, five explanations for the lack of competition in the French market were
found empirically: labor law L122-12, asymmetries, high tendering costs, high operation
risks, and the OA's perceived failure to conduct a fair selection. Before proposing
corrective measures that these explanations may suggest, we should provide a theoretical
framework, and in particular attempt to established the relation between the number of
bidders, their competitive behavior, the above five factors and the degree of competition
in the market. These are the objectives of the next chapter.
Chapter 4: Analysis of Barriers to Entry and Prospects for
Improvement
In order to meet the twofold challenge of increased social welfare and improved
economic efficiency, the "limited competition" model consists of two elements. The first
component is the OA's strong role in network integration and fare policy which aims at
maximizing the effectiveness of the urban public transport system. The second
component, tendering, aims at improving economic efficiency by bringing competition to
bear in the production of the urban public transport services. In this thesis, we focus on
the second component and assess the performance of the French tendering system in
bringing competition in the market. We shall, of course, at some point of our reflection,
bring back into the picture the crucial interrelation between tendering's "control role"
(control of the quantity and quality of supply) and its "efficiency role" (Berechman,
1993).
In Chapter 3, we provided evidence of the poor outcome of the French tendering
system, observing that there are few players in the urban public transport market and that
they do not actively compete. The French urban public transport industry is highly
concentrated and many networks are in fact controlled by local monopolies. Intuitively,
we may be tempted to state that the prices tend to be monopoly prices in markets where
there are only a few competitors, and therefore fear that the concentration of the French
market may lead to excessive rents for the operators. Furthermore, we have empirically
identified five factors that may contribute to the poor outcome of the tendering process:
labor law L122-12, information asymmetries among bidders, tendering costs, operating
risks, and the OA's failure to follow a fair and transparent selection processes. The
purpose of Chapter 4 is to provide some theoretical support for these empirical
deductions. To that end, we shall first establish a clear logical link between competition,
concentration and the five factors empirically identified. Once the causality of these five
factors on the degree of competition is established, we shall propose a set of measures
that aim to diminish the impact of the last four factors, assuming that labor law L122-12
is unchanged.
This chapter will consist of three sections. We shall review the relevant economic
and Industrial Organization theories, including Demsetz (1968)'s introduction of
competitive tendering, and Baumol (1982)'s theory of market contestability. From this
brief literature review, we shall have a clear understanding of how tendering is supposed
to generate competition, and of the main conditions for its effective functioning, i.e. the
elimination or reduction of barriers to entry. In the second section, we shall then justify
the fact that the four factors identified in Chapter 3 effectively constitute barriers to entry.
Finally, in the last section, we shall propose a set of corrective measures, trying to capture
the interactions among them and their impacts on the performance of the first
"component" of the model, which ensures the effectiveness of the service.
4.1 Competitive bidding and market contestability
The artificiality of the concept of perfect competition has led many economists to
seek a more "realistic" concept with less stringent conditions for its realization. We shall
next review the contributions of Demsetz and Baumol to this search for a concept of
competition applicable to markets that are not naturally perfectly competitive.
4.1.1 Demsetz' Theory
In his paper "Why Regulate Utilities", Demsetz (1968) developed a concept that
was introduced earlier by Chadwick (1859) and known as "competition for the field" as
distinct from "competition within the field". Demsetz first showed that the commonly
asserted relationship between concentration and competition - the fewer the number of
competitors, the less the competition in the market - cannot be derived from theoretical
considerations. He criticized the theory of natural monopoly for not revealing the logical
step between scale economies in production and monopoly price. Most relevant to our
thesis, Demsetz proposed the use of a bidding process to bring market forces into the
market:
"The competitiveness of the bidding process depends very much on such things as
the number of bidders, but there is no clear or necessary reason for production scale
economies to decrease with the number of bidders. Let prospective buyers call for bids to
service their demands. Scale economies in servicing their demands in no way imply that
there will be one bidder only. There can be many bidders and the bid that wins will be the
lowest. The existence of scale economies in the production of the service is irrelevant to a
determination of the number of rival bidders. If the number of bidders is large or if, for
other reasons, collusion among them is impractical, the contracted price can be very close
to per-unit production cost."
He concludes that, as long as each bidder submits a bid based on the assumption
that if its bid is the lowest, he will be awarded the contract for the entire job, there is no
monopoly price as the price is determined in the bidding market. Demsetz makes two
important assumptions, which are also, as he recognized, the conditions required to avoid
monopoly pricing in any market, whether production in that market is subject to scale
economies or not. The first is that the inputs required to enter production are available to
many potential bidders at prices determined in open markets. This condition is key to
having a high number of bidders. The second assumption is that the cost of colluding by
bidding rivals is prohibitively high. In the event that the second condition is not met,
Demsetz argues that if the buyers have access to the same technology of collusion or
merger, the market will be characterized by bilateral negotiations between organized
buyers and organized sellers. Finally, in order to avoid likely duplication of facilities
implied by private ownership, he advocates public ownership of the public utility
distribution systems.
How can this theory be applied to the French urban public transport industry? It
should first be noted that the French tendering system is more complex than the bidding
process described by Demsetz. First, there is a qualification round in the French tendering
procedure that ensures that every bidder has the necessary experience. Second, the
selection of the winner is not based on price considerations alone, but also integrates
other criteria such as quality of service. Finally, the price and contract terms are finalized
in the negotiation round after the opening of the bids. Another departure from Demsetz
model is that it seems difficult for OAs to collude or merge in response to operators'
collusion or mergers.
However, this theory may suggest several interesting ideas. First, it hints that
neither concentration nor scale economies alone can be considered as explanations for the
lack of competition. Second, the degree of competitiveness depends heavily on the
number of bidders, which in turn depends on the fulfillment of the first assumption:
production inputs must be available to many bidders. In the French urban public transport
industry, the inputs required to enter production, if understood in a wide sense, are not
easily obtained in the market: competent executives with technical and management
know-how, and the references and credibility provided by experience in other networks
with similar characteristics are the main requirements to enter the tendering process.
Searching for explanations for the lack of competition in the French urban public
transport market, we now turn to Baumol's theory of market contestability in order to
further develop Demsetz first condition and, thus, undertake a more complete analysis of
barriers to entry.
4.1.2 Baumol's Theory
Baumol et al. (1982) contrast two definitions of barrier to entry: that proposed by
Stigler (1968) and the one given by von Weizsacker (1980). Stigler defines a barrier to
entry "as a cost of producing (at some or every rate of output) which must be borne by a
firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry." In
contrast, von Weizsacker defines an entry barrier as an obstacle to the flow of resources
into the industry that results in excessive protection of incumbent firms - excessive in the
sense that this protection of incumbent firms has undesirable consequences for social
welfare. Baumol argues that both definitions, Stigler's and von Weizsacker's, are
reconciled under his "perfectly contestable" market. Indeed, the conditions for a
"perfectly contestable" market model involve the absence of entry barriers in Stigler's
sense, and Baumol shows that this model forces socially optimal behavior upon the
incumbent firms in an industry.
Baumol defines a perfectly contestable market as "one that is accessible to
potential entrants and has the following two properties: First, the potential entrant can,
without restriction, serve the same market demands and use the same productive
techniques as those available to the incumbent firms. Thus, there is no entry barrier in the
sense of the term used by Stigler. Second the potential entrants evaluate the profitability
of entry at the incumbent firms' pre-entry prices. That is, although the potential entrants
recognize that an expansion of the industry outputs leads to lower prices-in accord with
the market demand curves-the entrants nevertheless assume that if they undercut
incumbents' prices they can sell as much of the corresponding good as the quantity
demanded by the market at their own prices."
Taking the extreme case of monopoly, Baumol shows that the pressure exerted by
the presence of potential entrants forces the monopolist to produce in an efficient manner
and at a normal rate of return on its capital investments. This pressure therefore suffices
to solve the traditional welfare problem of monopolistic behavior, "even if entry is never
successful". Here he obtains, in a more general form, the same result as Demsetz in his
analysis expressed in terms of bidding procedures. He indeed concludes that the
equilibrium requires that the price equal the average production cost. In both models, it is
clear that the operative force is freedom of entry. Under this condition, if an incumbent
were to try to set a price higher than the average cost, he would be undercut by a new
entrant.
Baumol's analysis goes further than that of Demsetz in many ways, and in
particular provides a detailed analysis of barriers to entry, and its relationship with sunk
costs. It shows that fixed costs of sufficient magnitude ensure the presence of natural
monopoly cost conditions, but do not contribute to barriers to entry as they do not have
negative consequences on welfare, as large fixed costs are compatible with many
attributes of competitive equilibrium; in contrast, sunk costs do constitute barriers to
entry that lead to losses in efficiency and welfare.
This last point is demonstrated in the following manner. "The need to sink money
into a new enterprise, whether it is physical capital, advertising, or anything else imposes
a difference between the incremental cost and the incremental risk that are faced by an
entrant and an incumbent". The incumbent has already committed sunk costs and these
funds are already exposed to the perils that the operation in the industry entails. On the
other hand, the entrant must freeze the corresponding amount of liquid capital in order to
enter the industry. The incremental cost for the new entrant is the full amount of the sunk
costs. In situations where the sunk costs are not expected to be covered by prospective
revenues, they may constitute a substantial difference between the potential entrants and
the incumbent firm. Potential entrants will consider that entry may be profitable only if
the profits in the event of success outweigh the sunk costs that will be lost in case of
failure. The potential entrants require additional revenues in order to compensate for the
excess of its incremental costs and incremental risks. These additional revenues can be
regarded as entry costs and therefore constitute a barrier to entry.
When considering the application of his theory to an industry that is not behaving
in a way that is expected of a contestable market, Baumol recommends identifying and
removing any artificial obstacle to contestability, i.e. entry costs or barriers to entry, and
to prevent predatory acts and deterring threats by incumbents.
French urban public transport markets are obviously far from this idealized
model, and if we follow Baumol's theory, the closer to perfect contestability the French
market will get, the more effective the competition will be. As recommended by Baumol,
we shall therefore identify the obstacles to contestability, i.e. barriers to entry in these
markets in section 4.2, and explore ways to remove these barriers to entry in section 4.3.
4.1.3 Concentration and Collusion
Bertrand (1883) stated that, under the condition that firms "meet only once" in the
market, even oligopolists behave like competitive firms - that is the number of firms is
irrelevant to the study of price behavior. In other words, even a duopoly would suffice to
restore competition. This is called the Bertrand paradox because it is hard to believe that
firms in industries where there are few firms never succeed in manipulating the market
price to make profits. However, the paradox is resolved by relaxing the condition of one-
shot competition to consider the more realistic situation where firms interact repeatedly.
Chamberlin (1929) suggested that in an oligopoly producing homogeneous
product, firms would recognize their interdependence and, therefore, might be able to
sustain monopoly prices without explicit collusion. The threat of a vigorous price war
would be sufficient to deter firms from cutting price.
Considering a small number of identical firms producing homogeneous product,
Chamberlin (1933) argued that the firms would charge the monopoly price:
" If each seeks his maximum profit rationally and intelligently, he will realize that
when there are only two or few sellers his own move has a considerable effect upon his
competitors, and this makes it idle to suppose that they will accept without retaliation the
losses he forces upon them. Since the result of a cut by any one is inevitably to decrease
his own profits, no one will cut, and although the sellers are entirely independent, the
equilibrium result is the same as though there were a monopolistic agreement between
them."
According to Tirole (1988), "there is a sense in which tacit collusion is easier to
sustain with a small number of firms". Considering the outcome of full collusion, in
which all n firms charge the monopoly price and share the market equally, he showed that
a large number of firms reduces the profits per firm and thus the cost of being punished.
In contrast, the short-run gain from undercutting the monopoly price decreases with n. He
concludes that market concentration facilitates tacit collusion.
Finally, from this review of various economic theories, we can draw two general
conclusions. The first conclusion is that a large number of competitors is desirable in
order to improve competition. The second is that this can be best achieved by the
removal, or at least the reduction, of entry costs, or barriers to entry, which are dealt with
in the next section.
4.2 Barriers to Entry
We shall here attempt to show that each of five empirically found reasons for a
lack of competition is, in fact, a barrier to entry, and therefore, indeed constitutes an
obstacle to competition according to Baumol's theory. We shall also show that, in the
context of the French urban public transport market, these five reasons are the most
important factors.
4.2.1 Labor Law L122-12
By imposing the renewal of all employment contracts in case of a change of
incumbent, labor law L122-12 reduces the scope of management issues on which
potential entrants may compete. This is likely to convince potential entrants that their
chance of defeating the incumbent is very low (much lower than if staff management
were subject to competition). As a result, many potential entrants will be deterred from
bidding. In this sense, this law protects the incumbent from rival bids and can be
considered as a barrier to entry.
4.2.2 Asymmetries
Beside the danger of collusion between bidders, Vickers and Yarrow (1988)
identify the incumbent firm's strategic advantages as the reason why bidding for a
franchise may fail to be competitive. They distinguish asymmetries in efficiency and
asymmetries in information, between the incumbent firm and the other firms. First, they
argue that the incumbent firm's experience from past operations is likely to have the
effect of reducing its costs of operation. The future franchise is therefore worth more to
the incumbent firm than to other firms. This fact may deter the other firms from
competing with the incumbent, because they know they are unlikely to win.
Asymmetries of information can be another strategic advantage for the incumbent
firm, as it is likely to have a better knowledge of cost and demand conditions than the
other firms. These asymmetries of information will deter other firms from competing
with the incumbent firm for the future franchise. If a firm wins the franchise over the
incumbent firm, it is likely that the new entrant, with its limited knowledge of the
operation costs and demand, has bid too little. This problem is known as the "winner's
curse". This verbal argument informally supports the general point that asymmetries of
information are indeed barriers to entry.
4.2.3 Tendering Costs
Tendering costs are mainly the costs of studying the current service production
and demand in order to prepare a proposal. The tendering costs depend in large part on
the size of the bundle of services to be tendered. In France where the whole network is
tendered at once, these studies may be resource intensive, especially in the case of large
networks with multi-modal operations. Consequently, tendering costs can reach several
million of French Francs for large networks, and are usually less than half a million of
French Francs for medium size networks serving a population below 200,000 inhabitants.
A new entrant has to pay tendering costs to enter the competition for the
franchise. These costs will be lower for the incumbent firm than for other firms, as the
incumbent firm can use its executives on site to prepare the bid. In any event, there will
be no resources involved in gaining local knowledge. Tendering costs, therefore, are a
barrier to entry. A few OAs, aware of this fact, offer reimbursement of a portion of the
tendering costs.
4.2.4 Operating Risks
We first note that high operating risks are not necessarily a consequence of the
OA's desire to transfer risk to the operators through a change in the contractual
relationship. Of course, a switch from a management contract to an operation contract
with financial compensation will substantially increase the risk to the delegatee.
However, this trend in contract types is here taken as given. We rather focus on other
causes of high operating costs, which include the size of the service to be tendered and
the length of the contract period.
Larger firms have a strong financial background that allows them to absorb higher
risks than smaller firms, which are more vulnerable. Furthermore, large firms can absorb
high operating risks better than small firms, as large firms' revenues are based on the
operation of many networks, which is not the case for small firms. As a result, high
operating risks in a tender will deter small firms from competing and leave only large
firms to bid. Therefore high operating costs also constitute a barrier to entry.
4.2.5 OA's Failure
The OA faces several problems. The first one is how to specify the service to be
provided in a call for tender without being discriminatory. For example, when the OA
requests that the service should be produced by an SEM, a legal structure which is unique
to the French system, there is discrimination against foreign firms. A second one is how
to select the winner when there are several dimensions to be taken into account. Beside
price, quality and other important factors need to be integrated in a weighted combination
that will constitute the selection criterion.
According to Berechman, the cumulative effect of the problems relative to the
design of a truly competitive tendering scheme may explain why transit agencies have
often used non-economic or non-transportation selection criteria, such as the firm's
reputation and previous relationships. He argues that use of such criteria may invite
political pressure from firms. This behavior constitutes a barrier to entry since the
incumbent is usually in a much better position to carry out such lobbying actions;
potential entrants are well aware of this advantage and for this reason, may choose not to
compete with the incumbent.
Apart from these five above-mentioned reasons, Vickers and Yarrow (1988) also
cite the danger of collusion and the problem of asset hand-over. As discussed in 4.1.3,
collusion is more likely to happen in markets where the number of competitors is small.
We shall therefore attempt to increase the number of potential entrants by removing the
barriers to entry. Asset hand-over is not relevant in the context of the French urban public
transport, as most OA's own the fleet of vehicles and the infrastructure. Most of the
above factors are also cited by Berechman (1993) as potential problems stemming from
the organization of a competitive tendering process.
We conclude that labor law L122-12, information asymmetries, high tendering
costs, high operating risks, and OA's failure are the main barriers to entry, and therefore
the main obstacles to competition, in the French urban public transport industry. We shall
next propose a set of corrective measures that will aim at reducing these barriers to entry,
excluding labor law L122-12. Although labor law L122-12 is likely to have a larger
impact on competition than the other four factors (see section 3.2.3), we decided to focus
in this thesis on corrective measures that can be implemented without any regulatory
change. As suggested in section 4.1, the reduction of four of these barriers to entry is
expected to increase the number of participants in the bidding, which will in turn increase
competition in the tendering process. This improvement in competition will however be
achieved within the limits set by labor law L122-12.
4.3 Exploration of Various Strategies
This thesis aims to discuss the performance of the tendering process in bringing
competition in the French urban public transport market. After having shown the poor
outcome of the tendering process and empirically identified the main obstacles for a more
competitive market in Chapter 3 and provided theoretical support in the first two sections
of this chapter, we shall now assess several strategies designed to reduce the identified
non-regulatory obstacles: first by describing what barriers to entry it lowers and how, and
second by assessing the negative effects it may have on other essential components of the
provision and production organization, such as service integration perceived by the users,
the OA's workload, the total cost of the tendering and contracting process, etc. A strategy
could be acceptable if the benefits of increased competition derived across its
implementation outweigh its drawbacks on other components of the provision and
production system. However, comparisons between factors from different dimensions are
usually not easy to make. The purpose of this approach is therefore to provide an
indication of the existing tradeoffs involved in these strategies, rather than to allow
definitive conclusions on the suitability of each strategy.
We shall assess three strategies that can be implemented by the OA and do not
require any regulatory change: reduction in the bundle size of service to be tendered out,
reduction of contract duration, and the improvement of the specification and selection
process.
4.3.1 Strategy 1: Reduction of the Bundle Size of Services to be Tendered
In the design of a competitive tendering process, one of the major challenges is to
define an optimal bundle of services to be tendered. A bundle of service can be defined
by modes, by areas or by groups of routes. Berechman (1993) argues that, in the absence
of scope and network economies and if attributes of individual services do not affect the
demand for other services (for instance, the change in frequency on one route does not
affect the demand on another route), the partition that would yield the highest degree of
competition is the partition into single-route tenders. However, these conditions usually
do not prevail and there is no obvious answer to this challenge.
The organization of the tendering and contracting process on a network basis
appears to be unique to the French system. In London and Scandinavian countries, the
bundle of services tendered out at each bidding is usually either a single route or a sub-
network. A size reduction of the bundle of services to be tendered out in the French
system from the network level to either route or sub-network level, which is possible
without any regulatory change, would contribute to lowering one of the four identified
barriers to entry, i.e. the operating risks.
We should note at this point that the OA's ownership of vehicles and
infrastructure, as found in France, is not compatible with a route-basis tendering: it is
hard to imagine a public depot shared by several operators. Only a reduction to the sub-
network level will therefore be considered. Scale economy considerations may suggest
further restricting the scope of application of this strategy. Most studies conclude that the
urban public transport industry shows scale economies in a limited range. Isotope (1997)
argued that scale economies were exhausted at around 100 buses. Berechman (1993)
considered an optimal range of 100 to 500 vehicles where returns to scale are slightly
positive or constant. Isotope (1997) stressed that this size refers to operational production
units, typically depots, and therefore recommends that each operator be in charge of a
sub-network large enough to have one or more depots, each depot having at least 100
vehicles.
All the networks in the new survey's sample have a fleet of more than 100
vehicles, Lens-Lievin having the smallest fleet with 103 vehicles and Lyons the largest
with 1,177 vehicles. Taking into account scale economies and route interdependence
problems, a partition into sub-networks should be envisaged only in the case where sub-
networks would correspond to individual fleets of over 100 vehicles each, where an
allocation of each fleet to single-operator managed depots would be practical and where
the integrity of the major corridors would be respected. The threshold regarding fleet size
between the networks which could apply this strategy and those that could not, may be
around 250 to 300 vehicles, where the split into two networks is likely to be feasible. This
would then be feasible in only 7 networks in our sample: Lyon, Lille, Toulouse,
Bordeaux, Nantes, Rennes, and Montpellier.
The strategy of tendering out sub-networks, rather than the entire network, would
lower the operating risks as it would reduce the amounts of operating costs and revenues
involved. For the operators, it would also reduce the complexity of assessing the
interconnection problems in the case of large networks, often cited as a major deterrent
for non-incumbent firms. It may consequently enable a significant cut in the tendering
costs as the scope of the study to prepare the bid would be reduced. This strategy would,
thus, potentially contribute to lowering two barriers to entry. By dividing operating rights
over a subset of the network, this strategy also allows bench-marking between different
sub-networks, which can stimulate competitive pressure among operators.
This strategy has two major drawbacks. First, it may increase the OAs and
operators' workload and the total cost of tendering and contracting as the number of these
tasks will be multiplied by the number of sub-networks. However, there are reasons for
not fearing excessive additional costs for both operators and OAs. The scope of service
tendered at each tender is much smaller, and the reduction in workload may be larger
than proportional to the reduction in the scope of service, as the exceptional character of
the procedure will tend to disappear. In establishing an appropriate procurement unit to
cope with this new administrative and legal task (tendering and contracting), both the
operators and OAs will increase their fixed costs. For OAs and operators with staff fully
dedicated to procurement, the marginal cost of a new tender is expected to be small. This
leads to recommending the combination of this strategy with the next one which consists
in a reduction of the contract period, in order to fully utilize the investment in human
resources already made. As only large networks are affected by this strategy, we can also
assume that the OA's additional costs on their department in charge of procurement will
not represent a substantial increase in the payroll. However, on the operators' side, it may
create a new barrier to entry, as big firms are more able to absorb these additional costs,
than small firms. Moreover, despite the scale economy considerations, we must conclude
that this strategy will inevitably lead to an increase in the total transaction costs.
One could argue that a second drawback of this strategy is that it implies a shift of
the responsibility over part of the network integration back to the OA, for integration
aspects including network design, ticketing, inter-modal interfaces with respect to
scheduling and physical transfer. Two questions arise from this hypothesis. First, is it
desirable to transfer back integration responsibilities to the OA? In fact, it could be
argued that this responsibility has never been transferred to the operator, as the operator
is only invited to suggest potential improvements regarding integration but the final
decision is always left to the OA.
A second question is whether by having several operators instead of one,
integration benefits will be reduced. Certainly, integration issues may be more important
than in the case of a single operator, especially in the contractual specification of the
service to be provided by each operator. Smart card technology is expected to resolve the
problem of revenue apportionment between operators in the case of net-cost contracts.
Several networks have already experimented with this new technology: Valencienne in
1997, Nice in January 1999, followed by Amiens, Montpellier and Perpignan. Larger
networks such as Lyon, Strasbourg, and Bordeaux, have recently organized a call for
tenders for the implementation of smart card technology (Viennet, 1999). Regarding
network design, the study of network integration aspects in large networks are often
carried out by independent consulting firms before any new tendering. Overall, the new
coordination task of the OA between operators should not be an obstacle, as shown in the
experience of Scandinavia and London.
In conclusion, the argument that tendering at a sub-network-basis (compared to
tendering at a network-basis) is detrimental to the network integration may only hold for
the marketing strategy, if delegated to the operator. Furthermore, it would actually help
clarify the current situation: the OA thinks it delegates some integration responsibilities
to the operator, and the latter complains, usually with good reason, that he is not actually
given any freedom to manoeuver on integration issues.
4.3.2 Strategy 2: Reduction of the Contract Time Length
A reduction of the contract time length could lower two barriers to entry: the
operating risks and the asymmetries of information. Shorter contractual periods mean
lower future contingencies, therefore lower risks. This strategy would also allow more
frequent revision of the services to be provided, and therefore improve the specification
process.
Delegation contracts in France - 5 to 7 year terms in 15 out the 17 surveyed
networks - are similar to franchise contracts in London (5 years) and Denmark (5 to 6
years). Why then consider a reduction below what seems to be the commonly accepted
time length of 5 to 7 years? The main arguments in favor of the 5-year minimum were
developed under the assumption that the operator owns the vehicles. In this situation, a
contract duration below 5 years does not allow a satisfactory investment cost recovery
opportunity and creates an incentive to use old vehicles, thereby increasing the need for
further contractual specifications by the OA. Moreover, short contracts tend to favor big
operators who can easily transfer vehicles between cities (Isotope, 1997).
However, in France, vehicles are in most cases - in all the networks of our sample
- owned by the OA and such arguments do not hold, except for relatively small
investments in the computer system, which could also be purchased by the OA. We
therefore consider the strategy of reducing contract length to 3 years. The minimum of 3
years is suggested by two observations. First, 3 years is the minimum workable duration
of the managers assignment across most industries; a lower term would impair the
managerial efficiency and recruitment prospects. A second reason is the incompressible
duration of the tendering process, which currently ranges between 8 to 14 months
according to our survey. It should be noted from the outset that this strategy should be
considered only if the effective duration of the tendering process can be reduced to a
maximum of 6 months or less than 20% of the contract cycle.
Because it aims to establish transparency and fairness in the selection process, the
tendering procedure tends to be incompressible. The creation of an ad hoc commission
and the validation of the decisions by the general assembly, where all political forces are
represented, guarantee transparency in the process. The minimum legally acceptable
duration of each step allows enough time for potential protests. We should note the short
time allowed for operators to prepare their bids: only 30 days are required by law.
Usually, OA's extend this period to 1.5 or 2 months, but it remains rather short compared
to the duration of the whole procedure which tends to span over 8 to 14 months.
A reduction of the length of the tendering procedure however seems possible. The
minimum legally acceptable times for all steps added together give a total of only 3 _
months, whereas tendering procedures tend to last 8 months or more. A reduction of the
length of the tendering procedure could be achieved by the reduction of the time period
actually spent on all steps except the bid preparation. A stronger motivation of the OA to
speed up the process may help. It may nevertheless still be necessary to hire more staff,
as already discussed in section 4.3.1.
A short time to prepare the bid obviously contributes to increasing the incumbent
firm's advantage over its rivals. One solution is to make the necessary information
public, well before the pre-qualification stage, so that firms could have more time for
inquiries and the OA more time to prepare detailed answers. The pre-qualification stage
should rely on standard selection criteria and should not imply any risk of non
qualification for competent companies. Furthermore, the actual exchange of questions
and answers should still take place after the pre-qualification stage for parity reasons.
Strategies 1 and 2, by reducing the (physical and time) scope of tenders, may also help
ease this problem.
Let us now consider the drawbacks of this short-term contract strategy. First, there
is the direct transactional cost of holding more auctions. However, a reduction of the
contract term from 6 to 3 years may not result in a doubling of tendering costs for both
OA's and operators. We have seen in 4.3.1 the scale economies resulting from setting up
a procurement unit. Another factor is that the evolution of the networks and the OA's
goals will be smaller over a shorter period. Consequently, the volume of corrective or
new actions to undertake for each contractual period may be reduced, as may be the
workload involved in the bid preparation, especially if studies from the previous bid can
be better used.
A second drawback is that shorter contracts may create a lack of incentive for the
incumbent operator to provide good maintenance of the vehicles, to improve the
organization of the service production, and to make efforts to train the staff and maintain
cohesion within the working teams. Indeed, the perspective of being replaced and of
losing all advantages from these efforts often dissuades the incumbent from investing in
these areas. One way to solve this is to take into account in the tendering process the
incumbent's performance during the current contract, especially its performance in the
last few months (Donati, 1998). For instance, if the quality of service measured by
indicators such as the number of service interruptions is taken into account in the
selection of the new delegatee, the incumbent may be discouraged from reducing its
vehicle maintenance efforts in the final months of the contractual period. More generally,
the advantage of this method is to establish a more tangible link between the firm's
reputation and its actual performance.
A last drawback of this strategy may be that it increases the frequency of the
confrontation between the major operator groups. As seen in 4.1.3, repeated
confrontation may lead to collusion. We can however consider that large groups are
already competing in many markets and, for this reason, this strategy is unlikely to have
any effect on collusion.
4.3.3 Strategy 3: Improvement of the Specification and Selection process
As already seen, the OA's face two challenges: on the one hand, to control the
quality and quantity of service produced by the delegatee, and on the other hand, to
ensure through the use of market forces in the delegatee's selection that the service is
produced efficiently. These two roles often conflict and make the OA's tasks more
difficult, especially the specification of service to be provided, and the selection of the
new delegatee.
From interviews conducted with OAs and representatives of the Ministry of
Transport, we have the impression that French OAs tend to give priority to the control
objective, to the detriment of the efficiency - or competition setting - objective. Several
reasons can be advanced to explain this tendency. First, the OAs are governed by elected
officials who are well aware that urban public transport users are also voters. Elected
officials, therefore, want to make sure of the quality of service and are usually not ready
to take the risk of changing an operator, with the potential transition problems that it
implies. A second reason, more specific to the current French system, is the fact that the
service delegation is for the whole network and for a period exceeding the elected
officials mandate. These circumstances raise the stakes of the tendering process outcome
and may make the elected officials even more risk averse. Strategies 1 and 2 would
certainly help reduce the stakes at each tender, and could improve the balance between
the OA's control role and its efficiency role. However, as seen, these strategies involve a
high workload for the OA.
Let us see next the possible improvements in the way French OA's carry out the
specification of the service to be tendered and the selection process, so as to lower the
above-mentioned barriers to entry as much as possible. The specification process should
avoid introducing discriminatory criteria. One example, cited earlier, is OA's request that
the structure of the delegatee be an SEM. This specification clearly discriminates against
foreign groups as this legal structure is specifically French. By choosing to keep this
structure, the OA minimizes the risks associated with a radical change in its relationship
with the operating entity. For instance, it enjoys a high volume of information on
operations thanks to its status as a major shareholder in the SEM. However, by
eliminating foreign competition from the outset, the OA's reduce their chance of
establishing a truly competitive tendering process in the long run. When analyzing the
potential discriminatory effect of each specification, the OA may consider the
discrimination between the incumbent firm and the potential entrant, but also between the
French groups and the foreign groups, whose participation, we have seen earlier, may be
crucial in the long run.
Together with the description of the service specifications, the OA provides
operations statistics to the operators qualified to submit a bid. There were complaints,
especially in tendering for large networks, about the poor quality of these statistics. The
objectives in terms of quality of service are not correctly specified in many specification
documents. They are too vague ("satisfy the customer") whereas the continuous
improvement of quality would require a clear definition, in advance, of the level of
service to be provided (UTP, 1999).
Recently, some OAs have successfully negotiated the implementation of more
comprehensive and more relevant operation statistics in the new delegation contract
(most of them with the previous incumbent). Besides requiring better monitoring of the
present incumbent firm operations, detailed and comprehensive operation statistics can
help reduce the information asymmetry between the incumbent operator and the potential
bidders, and thus allow more firms to prepare a bid at acceptable cost.
Better operation statistics will also enable the OA to rely more on quantitative
data in the specification and in the selection process during the tendering stage, and
therefore make a more moderate use of the intuitu personae, which is the focus point of
criticism from some foreign operators on the selection process. Standardization of these
quality and cost indicators across networks and their effective use in the appraisal of the
proposals would reduce the subjectivity and unpredictability of the actual criteria used by
each OA. If this strategy were applied, the potential entrants would have a better
perception of the fairness of the selection process.
In conclusion, most actions included in this recommended strategy involve an
effort in the short run (negotiating comprehensive operation statistics, accept structural
changes in the organization of the service production) that is expected to yield benefits in
the long run (more bidders), and the implementation of this strategy will heavily depend
on the decision makers ability to take a long term perspective, well beyond their mandate.
4.3.4 Concluding Remarks
First, let us summarize the effects each strategy is likely to have on the four
barriers to entry. Table 3.14 shows that the set of three strategies is complementary as no
single strategy can tackle all four barriers to entry. The three strategies should be
implemented together for maximum impact.
Table 4.1: Effects of Each Strategy on Barriers to Entry
Asymmetries Tendering Operating OA's Failure
Costs Costs
Sl: Split into sub- - Strong Strong
networks
S2: Reduction of - - Some Some
contract duration
S3: Improved Strong - - Strong
Specification/ selection
To underline this last point we note synergies between these individual strategies.
For instance, in short-term contracts (strategy 2), fewer future contingencies need to be
catered for, therefore diminishing the difficulties of contract specification and
administration (strategy 3) (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). Perfect bidding parity - i.e. the
absence of asymmetries - among bidders, resulting from an appropriate specification at
the tendering and contracting levels (strategy 3), is crucial to the efficacy of short-term
contracts (strategy 2) (Williamson, 1976).
Second, it should be noted that there seems to be no strong barrier to entry
originating from the French regulatory framework itself. All four barriers to entry, if not
entirely created by OA's practices, can be reduced by some appropriate actions
undertaken by OAs. OA's concern of keeping their workload low, or the constraint of
current limited human resources, may prevent them from considering alternatives to their
present practices, whereas these alternatives may bring benefits that are superior to the
costs associated with the staff increase. The three strategies explored in this section
involves a higher workload for OAs, with more tenders to organize, more frequently, and
with a higher level of detail in the specifications. The first strategy also implies that the
OAs have to deal with several operators at the time, adding a new role to the OA, the role
of coordination between operators. Therefore, before implementing any of these
strategies, the OAs should ensure sufficient in-house resources. This need for increased
competence and human resources in OAs is already well identified, including at the
Ministry of Transport level.
In contrast with the ideas developed by Demsetz (1968), much of the recent
literature argues (Berechman, 1993; World Bank, 1995) that public ownership of the
vehicle fleets is not an efficient organization, considering that "the separation of
investment from operation decisions is bound to result in resource misallocation,
manifested by over-capitalization and the dispensable and under-utilized services"
(Berechman, 1993). Although we should note that problems of under-capitalization, not
over-capitalization, are observed in the French urban public transport industry, we will
not discuss this issue further here.
Finally, we should stress that we have explored in this chapter corrective
strategies that can be implemented within the existing regulatory framework, especially
labor law L122-12. As this law is a significant barrier to entry and as the reduction of its
negative impact on competition is (deliberately) not addressed in this thesis, the impact of
the set of proposed strategies is likely to be modest.
Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusions
The organizational regime of urban public transport in France outside the Paris
region is a variant of the limited competition model. This model is a compromise
between the traditional regulated regime and the fully deregulated regime, keeping
strong public control from the former model and taking market forces from the latter
model through the tendering of services to be contracted out. As noted in Chapter 2, the
French system has been somewhat successful in stopping the decline in the ridership. In
contrast, there are concerns among some OAs over the level of competition achieved in
the tenders in the French networks, and therefore over contract prices. Although well
aware of the high degree of interrelation between the two components of this
organizational system - strong public control and competition through tendering -, we
therefore focused in this thesis on the performance of the component expected to create
competition, i.e. the tendering process.
We have shown in Chapter 3 that the performance of the French tendering process
in bringing competition to the French urban public transport market has been rather
disappointing. This problem is especially acute in the networks with a population over
200,000 inhabitants. We have noted in particular the small number of participants in the
bidding and their lack of competitive behavior, resulting in an average number of bids per
tender of 1.3 (for the large networks), compared with an average of 3.3 observed in the
London tenders for bus services. Moreover, although some British groups have shown
some signs of interest in the French market, they have elected not to bid for large
networks.
There are many reasons for the poor performance of the French tendering system.
We have identified five explanations: labor law L122-12 (which requires the new
operator to renew the contracts of all the incumbent's employees), asymmetries between
the incumbent firm and the potential entrants, high tendering costs, high operating risks,
and the OA's failure in the specification and selection process. In Chapter 4, a literature
review of the theoretical works by Demsetz (1968), Baumol (1982) and Tirol (1988),
among others, suggested that all these factors are actually barriers to entry, and that they
should be removed, or at least reduced, in order to stimulate the entry of new competitors
and therefore true competition.
Labor law L122-12 implies that in the French system a tradeoff has been made
between more social protection for the employees of the urban public transport
companies and less potential for competition in the tenders for the service contracts.
Although labor law L122-12 is likely to have a larger impact on competition than the
other four factors (see section 3.2.3), we focus in this thesis on corrective measures that
can be implemented without affecting this tradeoff, i.e. without any change in labor law
L122-12. Three strategies were, thus, assessed: reduction in the bundle size of service to
be tendered out, reduction of contract duration, and the improvement of the specification
and selection process.
The first strategy, consisting in a reduction in the bundle size of service to be
tendered out, i.e. the split into sub-networks, is expected to reduce tendering costs and
operating risks. The second strategy, consisting in a reduction of contract duration, aims
to lower operating risks and to remedy OA's failure in the specification and selection
process. Finally, the third strategy, which recommends the improvement of the
specification and selection process, besides addressing OA's failure, may reduce
asymmetries among bidders. For maximum effect on competition, we recommend that
these strategies be implemented together.
As the impact of labor law L122-12 is not addressed by these strategies, the effect
on competition of these strategies is likely to be modest. However, we consider that their
implementation may yield important improvements. Indeed, as shown by the literature
review and the results of the two surveys, as soon as there are two bidders in competition,
the final price is usually at competitive levels. In other words, there is a big difference
between a single-bid outcome and a two-bid outcome, and we are confident that this set
of strategies can help some OAs, especially those in charge of larger networks, to
accomplish this leap.
Indeed, if all four non-regulatory barriers to entry are reduced through the
implementation of this set of strategies, and if this reduction is sufficiently publicized
among the operators, more firms are likely to consider that, under the new situation, their
chance of defeating the incumbent will have increased, the cost of preparing a bid will
have decreased, and therefore, that their participation in French tenders may then make
more sense than presently.
Moreover, it was suggested that the OAs should have a long-term approach and
take the necessary steps to ensure the participation of a sufficiently large number of large
groups. We may mention here the survey on London tenders that provided empirical
evidence that the larger the number of bidders, the lower the contract price. In view of the
concentration of the French industry, the participation in French tenders of small firms
and foreign groups has consequently become crucial for true competition and non-
monopoly prices. A clear selection process and a reduction of operating risks through a
split into sub-networks may be the strategies that will best serve this purpose.
This thesis has mainly focused on larger French networks. It could be interesting
to explore strategies that could be implemented in smaller networks, which usually face
specific constraints including limited resources in staff and competence, possible direct
interference from elected officials, and difficulty in attracting foreign firms because of
the small size of the service.
Another area for further research is the systematic investigation of the relationship
between number of bidders and tendered prices in all French networks, as done for
London tenders by London Transport Bus (1999, b). If confirmed, this evidence would
strengthen the conclusions of this thesis.
Finally, we assume the public ownership of vehicles and depots as given. Guided
by the more successful experience of London, further research on how to increase
competition in French tenders could consist in the comparison of the advantages of public
fleet and depot ownership with those of private ownership, which in particular allows
route-based tendering. This analysis would be especially relevant in the French context of
lack of capital funds for new urban public transport projects. It would also be relevant in
the European context as the European Commission is preparing a new regulation that will
set the standards for the organization of urban public transport services and considers the
French delegation of service system as an alternative.
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